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  Note	  to	  readers:	  This	  is	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	  a	  book	  manuscript	  entitled	  Europe’s	  
Functional	  Constitution:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Constitutionalism	  Beyond	  the	  State.	  The	  manuscript	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  adapting	  constitutionalism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  ordering	  to	  postnational	  institutions	  of	  governance	  in	  light	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  system.	  It	  argues,	  more	  specifically,	  that	  the	  EU	  instantiates	  a	  new	  model	  of	  constitutional	  rule,	  which	  I	  propose	  to	  term	  “functional	  constitutionalism.”	  Constitutional	  theorists	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  constitutional	  authority	  as	  deriving	  from	  two	  key	  principles:	  democratic	  self-­‐rule	  and	  individual	  liberty.	  Although	  the	  EU	  has	  many	  of	  the	  features	  of	  a	  constitutional	  system,	  it	  derives	  its	  authority	  from	  neither	  of	  these	  principles.	  Instead,	  its	  claim	  to	  bind	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  is	  based	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  effective	  government:	  the	  delegation	  of	  governance	  tasks	  to	  supranational	  institutions	  is	  commonly	  viewed	  and	  justified	  a	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  policy	  challenges	  and	  systemic	  imperatives	  that	  member	  states	  cannot	  address	  acting	  singly.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  this	  power-­‐building	  logic	  is	  prominent	  in	  other,	  domestic	  instances	  of	  constitutional	  rule,	  drawing	  on	  work	  by	  North	  and	  Weingast,	  Holmes,	  Elster,	  and	  others	  on	  the	  enabling	  nature	  of	  sovereign	  commitment.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter,	  included	  below,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  EU	  prioritizes	  this	  power-­‐building	  logic	  as	  the	  primary	  normative	  justification	  for	  the	  extraordinarily	  wide	  scope	  of	  authority	  wielded	  by	  supranational	  institutions.	  The	  chapter	  explains	  why	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  should	  be	  considered	  an	  instance	  of	  a)	  functional	  b)	  constitutionalism.	  	  	  	  Comments	  are	  very	  welcome	  at	  nti2002@columbia.edu,	  but	  please	  do	  not	  quote,	  cite,	  or	  circulate	  the	  chapter	  without	  the	  author’s	  permission.	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  Chapter	  Two	  	  	  Functional	  constitutionalism	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  	   	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  European	  Union’s	  authority	  follows	  a	  pattern	  of	  justification	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  domestic	  constitutional	  norms:	  it	  enables	  states	  to	  make	  long-­‐term	  commitments	  in	  order	  to	  wield	  their	  power	  more	  effectively.	  Just	  as	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Federalist	  Papers	  justified	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  proposed	  US	  Constitution	  on	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  several	  states	  with	  appeals	  to	  “the	  necessity	  of	  energetic	  government,”1	  the	  European	  Union	  claims	  authority	  over	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  in	  order	  to	  address	  “problems	  that	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  solved	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  nation-­‐states	  or	  by	  the	  traditional	  method	  of	  agreements	  between	  sovereign	  states.”2	  Like	  certain	  domestic	  constitutional	  norms	  that	  aim	  at	  effective	  government,	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  legal	  system	  is	  “designed	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  enhancing	  the	  combined	  problem-­‐solving	  capacity”	  they	  posses.3	  What	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  shown,	  however,	  is	  how	  this	  supranational	  system	  of	  sovereign	  commitment	  adds	  up	  to	  a	  constitutional	  order	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  This	  is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  present	  chapter.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  problem	  of	  international	  cooperation	  can	  be	  analogized	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  constitutional	  rule:	  both	  are	  forms	  of	  sovereign	  commitment,	  and	  both	  face	  the	  formidable	  challenge	  of	  getting	  rulers	  to	  observe	  limits	  on	  their	  power.	  International	  agreements,	  like	  constitutions,	  pose	  “parchment	  barriers	  against	  the	  encroaching	  spirit	  of	  power,”4	  and	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  various	  mechanisms	  to	  impel	  sovereign	  agents	  to	  fulfill	  their	  obligations.	  Where	  the	  problems	  are	  similar,	  we	  may	  expect	  to	  see	  similar	  solutions,	  though	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	  the	  latter	  exist	  in	  any	  necessary	  causal	  relationship	  to	  the	  former.5	  It	  is	  
                                                1	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  “Federalist	  No.1:	  Introduction,”	  in	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  James	  Madison,	  John	  Jay,	  The	  Federalist	  Papers,	  ed.	  Ian	  Shapiro	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  emphasis	  added.	  2	  Jurgen	  Habermas,	  “The	  European	  Nation-­‐State:	  On	  the	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  Sovereignty	  and	  Citizenship”	  in	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other	  (MIT	  Press:	  1998),	  106	  2	  Jurgen	  Habermas,	  “The	  Eur pean	  Nation-­‐State:	  On	  the	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  Sovereignty	  and	  Citizenship”	  in	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other	  (MIT	  Press:	  1998),	  106	  
3 Stephen Holmes, “To ‘Facilitate Future Invasions of the Remainder’: Westward Expansion and its Natural 
Enemies in the Federalist Papers” (October 28, 2014). Draft paper on file with the author.  
4 Federalist No.48 
5 This is the assumption that undergirds the functionalist approach to comparative law. In David Kennedy’s 
words, proponents of this approach “[explain] diversity of legal solutions in terms of common policies 
based on functional needs and evaluating which pattern of rules most effectively carries out policy.” David 
Kennedy, “New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance,” Utah 
Law Review, 1997, no.2, pp.545-637, 589 n.73. Dunoff & Trachtman apply a functionalist approach to 
fleshing out the similarities between the tasks of domestic and international constitutional law. They argue 
that these tasks are primarily those of enabling and constraining further norm-making. See Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization,” in Jeffrey 
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obvious,	  however,	  that	  not	  all	  international	  regimes	  can	  be	  described	  as	  constitutional	  systems	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  In	  what	  sense	  can	  the	  EU	  be	  considered	  a	  constitutional	  order?	  Or	  does	  such	  consideration	  entail	  a	  category	  mistake?	  Although	  the	  1957	  Treaty	  Establishing	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  was	  an	  agreement	  among	  sovereign	  states,	  over	  the	  first	  few	  decades	  of	  its	  existence,	  it	  evolved	  into	  a	  sophisticated	  legal	  framework.	  The	  present-­‐day	  European	  Union	  replicates	  many	  institutional	  devices	  of	  constitutional	  rule	  at	  the	  supranational	  level,	  including	  a	  functionally	  delimited,	  hierarchically	  ordered	  system	  of	  legal	  norms,	  a	  mechanism	  of	  judicial	  review	  over	  member	  state	  acts,	  a	  schedule	  of	  individual	  rights	  enforceable	  in	  domestic	  courts,	  and	  a	  supranational	  executive	  charged	  with	  making,	  implementing,	  and	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  norms.	  Each	  of	  these	  features	  responds	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  sovereign	  commitment,	  and	  each	  is	  familiar	  from	  the	  domestic	  context.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  scholars	  have	  argued	  since	  the	  1980s	  that	  the	  European	  Community	  (and	  its	  successor,	  the	  European	  Union)	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  constitutional	  terms.	  As	  Joseph	  Weiler	  put	  it,	  	   The	  constitutional	  thesis	  claims	  that	  in	  critical	  aspects	  the	  Community	  has	  evolved	  and	  behaves	  as	  if	  its	  founding	  instrument	  were	  not	  a	  Treaty	  governed	  by	  international	  law	  but,	  to	  use	  the	  language	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  a	  constitutional	  charter	  governed	  by	  a	  form	  of	  constitutional	  law.6	  Most	  versions	  of	  the	  “constitutional	  thesis”	  cast	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (now,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  or	  CJEU)	  as	  the	  architect	  of	  this	  supranational	  legal	  order.7	  The	  story	  has	  been	  told	  many	  times:	  through	  its	  far-­‐reaching	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relatively	  sparse	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome,	  the	  Court	  shepherded	  the	  member	  states,	  each	  with	  their	  distinct	  legal	  systems,	  under	  a	  dense	  canopy	  of	  supranational	  legal	  norms.8	  Proponents	  of	  the	  constitutional	  thesis	  maintain	  that	  this	  canopy	  is	  held	  up	  by	  three	  pillars.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  landmark	  rulings	  beginning	  with	  Costa	  v.	  
ENEL	  in	  1964,9	  the	  Court	  proclaimed	  that	  EC	  law	  took	  precedence	  over	  the	  laws	  of	  member	  states	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  conflict.	  According	  to	  the	  Court’s	  long-­‐standing	  doctrine,	  EU	  law	  must	  take	  precedence	  even	  over	  a	  member	  state’s	  constitutional	  
                                                                                                                                            
L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4, 10. 6	  J.H.H.	  Weiler,	  “The	  Reformation	  of	  European	  Constitutionalism,”	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  vol.35	  (1997),	  no.1,	  pp.97-­‐131,	  at	  97	  
7 Alec	  Stone	  Sweet,	  The	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Susanne	  K.	  Schmidt	  and	  R.	  Daniel	  Kelemen,	  The	  Power	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2013). 8	  For	  authoritative	  accounts	  of	  this	  process,	  see	  Joseph	  Weiler,	  “The	  community	  System:	  the	  dual	  character	  of	  supranationalism,”	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law,	  vol.1	  (1981),	  pp.268-­‐306;	  Karen	  Alter,	  
Establishing	  the	  Supremacy	  of	  European	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  Alec	  Stone	  Sweet,	  The	  
Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  9	  Case	  6/64,	  Flaminio	  Costa	  v.	  E.N.E.L.	  [1964]	  ECR	  585	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norms	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  conflict,	  (an	  assertion	  that	  has	  been	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  challenged	  by	  national	  constitutional	  courts).10	  	  Second,	  through	  the	  piecemeal	  and	  sometimes	  grudging	  acceptance	  of	  the	  supremacy	  doctrine	  by	  national	  courts,	  a	  system	  of	  judicial	  review	  has	  taken	  shape	  that	  integrates	  EU	  law	  into	  the	  legal	  systems	  of	  member	  states	  as	  a	  partially	  autonomous	  source	  of	  normative	  authority.	  Under	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure,	  national	  courts	  are	  empowered	  (and	  courts	  of	  last	  instance	  are	  required)	  to	  refer	  questions	  about	  the	  application	  of	  European	  law	  to	  the	  Court.11	  Over	  time,	  they	  have	  been	  directed	  by	  the	  CJEU	  to	  disregard	  any	  national	  legislation	  that	  comes	  into	  conflict	  with	  European	  law.	  This	  mechanism	  has	  not	  only	  enabled	  the	  CJEU	  to	  co-­‐opt	  domestic	  courts	  into	  a	  European	  judiciary	  with	  a	  supranational	  court	  as	  its	  primary	  guide,12	  but	  has	  also	  given	  ordinary	  national	  courts	  powers	  of	  judicial	  review	  normally	  reserved	  for	  constitutional	  courts,	  thus	  revising	  the	  domestic	  constitutional	  systems	  of	  member	  states	  in	  areas	  touched	  by	  EU	  law.13	  Moreover,	  because	  it	  is	  their	  own	  courts	  rather	  than	  a	  distant	  supranational	  body	  ordering	  member	  states	  to	  fulfill	  their	  obligations,	  supranational	  law	  has	  enjoyed	  a	  remarkable	  degree	  of	  application	  within	  member	  states.	  	  The	  doctrine	  of	  supremacy	  is	  one	  of	  an	  array	  of	  features	  that	  collectively	  lend	  EU	  law	  a	  highly	  entrenched	  status.	  The	  relative	  difficulty	  of	  modifying	  constitutional	  norms	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  process	  is	  a	  fairly	  common,	  though	  not	  uniform,	  feature	  of	  constitutional	  systems.	  Likewise	  in	  the	  EU,	  treaty	  provisions	  have	  a	  “super-­‐entrenched”	  status,	  with	  most	  amendments	  requiring	  unanimous	  approval	  and	  ratification	  by	  28	  member	  states.14	  Although	  the	  2009	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  introduced	  a	  so-­‐called	  “simplified	  revision	  procedure”	  for	  certain	  treaty	  amendments,	  these	  still	  require	  the	  relatively	  onerous	  conditions	  of	  a	  unanimous	  Council	  vote	  and	  approval	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament.15	  Even	  the	  revision	  of	  ordinary	  EU	  law	  is	  arduous,	  requiring	  either	  a	  qualified	  majority	  or	  unanimity	  among	  member	  states	  representatives	  in	  the	  Council,	  along	  with	  various	  complex	  
                                                10	  Case	  106/77,	  Amministrazione	  delle	  Finanze	  dello	  Stato	  v.	  Simmenthal	  SpA	  	  [1978]	  ECR	  629;	  Case	  C-­‐213/89,	  The	  Queen	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport,	  ex	  parte:	  Factortame	  Ltd	  and	  others	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐2433	  
11 Art 267 TFEU (ex-Art	  177) 12	  Stone	  Sweet,	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe;	  Anne-­‐Marie	  Burley	  and	  Walter	  Mattli,	  “Europe	  before	  the	  Court,”	  International	  Organization,	  vol.	  47	  (1993),	  no.1,	  pp.	  41-­‐76.	  See	  also	  their	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  motives	  underlying	  the	  national	  courts’	  cooperation	  with	  the	  ECJ	  in	  Water	  Mattli	  and	  Anne-­‐Marie	  Slaughter,	  Constructing	  the	  European	  Community	  Legal	  System	  from	  the	  Ground	  up	  (Florence:	  EUI	  Working	  Paper	  RSC,	  1996).	  See	  also,	  Renaud	  Dehousse,	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  
The	  Politics	  of	  Judicial	  Integration	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  [1994]	  1998).	  13	  Eric	  Stein,	  “Lawyers,	  Judges,	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  Transnational	  Constitution,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  Vo.75	  (1981),	  pp.1-­‐27,	  13;	  Stone	  Sweet,	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Europe;	  Mitchel	  de	  S.	  –O.	  –l’E	  Lasser,	  Judicial	  Deliberations:	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  Transparency	  and	  Legitimacy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  225;	  Miguel	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  “Sovereignty	  in	  Europe:	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  European	  political	  community,”	  in	  Mary	  L.	  Volcansek	  &	  John	  F.	  Stack,	  Jr.	  (eds),	  Courts	  Crossing	  Borders:	  Blurring	  the	  Lines	  of	  Sovereignty	  (Durham,	  NC:	  Carolina	  Academic	  Press,	  2005)	  
14 Christine Reh, “The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.47 (2009), no.3, pp.625-50, 635  
15 Art 48 (6-7) TEU. 
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procedures	  of	  input	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  Finally,	  all	  EU	  norms	  (that	  is,	  secondary	  legislation	  as	  well	  as	  treaty	  provisions)	  have	  entrenched	  status	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  domestic	  law,	  given	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  modified	  through	  the	  domestic	  legislative	  process.	  Even	  state-­‐by-­‐state	  opt-­‐outs	  must	  be	  negotiated	  at	  the	  Council	  or	  at	  an	  intergovernmental	  conference.	  In	  fact,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  reasons	  why	  the	  European	  Court	  has	  been	  able	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  an	  influential	  institution	  in	  the	  constitutional	  development	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  owing	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  modifying	  the	  treaty	  structure.16	  Taken	  together,	  these	  factors	  place	  the	  supranational	  legal	  order	  quite	  far	  along	  the	  continuum	  of	  entrenchment.	  The	  third	  pillar	  of	  the	  supranational	  legal	  order	  is	  the	  doctrine	  of	  direct	  effect.	  In	  1963,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  ruled	  that	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  give	  rise	  to	  individual	  rights	  that	  could	  be	  relied	  on	  by	  individual	  litigants	  before	  national	  courts.17	  In	  the	  ensuing	  decades,	  the	  Court	  gradually	  expanded	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  European	  law	  by	  finding	  more	  and	  more	  Treaty	  provisions	  and	  directives	  as	  capable	  of	  giving	  rise	  to	  individual	  rights.	  Consequently,	  member	  state	  nationals	  (after	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht,	  Union	  citizens)	  became	  the	  holders	  of	  a	  series	  of	  rights	  originating	  exclusively	  from	  European	  law.	  The	  nucleus	  of	  this	  regime	  is	  rights	  related	  to	  cross-­‐border	  economic	  activity.	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  conveys	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  freedoms	  of	  movement	  of	  persons,	  services,	  goods,	  and	  capital,	  by	  referring	  to	  them	  as	  “fundamental	  freedoms.”	  The	  normative	  ambiguity	  of	  this	  term	  is	  further	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  regards	  individuals	  as	  its	  legal	  subjects	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  rights	  that	  they	  may	  claim	  before	  national	  courts,	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  “moved…	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  separation	  of	  international	  public	  law	  and	  domestic	  law.”18	  Direct	  effect	  not	  only	  makes	  supranational	  norms	  an	  automatic	  part	  of	  domestic	  law,	  but	  it	  also	  establishes	  a	  capacity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  “carry	  its	  agency	  to	  the	  persons	  of	  the	  citizens.”19	  These	  last	  words	  are	  borrowed	  from	  Alexander	  Hamilton,	  who	  in	  1787	  cited	  “the	  power	  of	  extending	  its	  operations	  to	  individuals”	  as	  the	  most	  important	  criterion	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  federal	  system	  in	  eliciting	  compliance	  from	  its	  constituent	  units.20	  According	  to	  Hamilton,	  the	  qualitative	  leap	  from	  the	  largely	  intergovernmental	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	  to	  the	  
                                                
16 Stone Sweet, Judicial Construction of Europe, 66 17	  According	  to	  the	  ECJ,	  Treaty	  provision	  must	  be	  “clear,”	  “unconditional,”	  must	  give	  rise	  to	  “a	  negative	  obligation”	  on	  the	  part	  of	  states	  and	  not	  be	  dependent	  on	  implementing	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  direct	  effect.	  Case	  26/62,	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  v.	  Nederlandse	  Administratie	  der	  Belastingen	  [1963]	  ECR	  1.	  The	  Court	  later	  relaxed	  these	  criteria,	  choosing	  to	  give	  direct	  effect	  to	  the	  “principle”	  of	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work	  contained	  in	  ex-­‐Art	  119	  EC,	  which	  obligation	  was	  rather	  general,	  imprecise,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  “negative.”	  See	  Case	  43/75	  Defrenne	  v.	  SABENA	  [1976]	  ECR	  455	  
18 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, “On the Legitimacy of European Law,” Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
und internationals Privatrecht, vol. 58 (1994), no.4, pp. 615-35, 622.	  Pierre	  Pescatore,	  “The	  Doctrine	  of	  ‘Direct	  Effect’:	  An	  infant	  disease	  of	  Community	  law,”	  European	  Law	  Review,	  vol.8	  (1983),	  pp.	  155-­‐177,	  158;	  Joseph	  Weiler,	  “The	  Transformation	  of	  Europe,”	  Yale	  Law	  Journal,	  vol.100	  (1991),	  pp.	  2403-­‐2483. 
19 Federalist No.16 
20 Hamilton writes, “But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the 
intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens 
themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent 
exertion of an unconstitutional power.” Federalist No. 16 
 6 
proposed	  US	  Constitution	  was	  that	  the	  former	  is	  based	  on	  the	  “principle	  of	  legislation	  for	  states	  or	  governments,	  in	  their	  corporate	  or	  collective	  capacities,	  and	  as	  contradistinguished	  from	  the	  individuals	  of	  which	  they	  consist.”21	  By	  designating	  individual	  citizens	  as	  its	  immediate	  subjects,	  the	  European	  legal	  order,	  like	  the	  US	  Constitution,	  vested	  them	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  states’	  obligations.	  In	  announcing	  the	  direct	  effect	  doctrine	  in	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  justified	  it	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  moral	  import	  of	  protecting	  individual	  rights,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  protecting	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  supranational	  order	  by	  enlisting	  the	  “vigilance”	  of	  the	  individuals	  concerned.	  The	  Court’s	  insight	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  prescient.	  As	  the	  direct	  addressees	  of	  the	  supranational	  law,	  citizens	  of	  member	  states	  have	  indeed	  helped	  to	  hold	  member	  states	  to	  their	  obligations.	  	  	  In	  1986,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  carried	  the	  European	  legal	  order’s	  three	  decades	  of	  development	  to	  its	  high	  water	  mark	  by	  calling	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  the	  “constitutional	  charter”	  of	  the	  European	  Community.22	  It	  argued	  that	  “The	  	  European	  Economic	  Community	  is	  a	  community	  based	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  inasmuch	  as	  neither	  its	  Member	  States	  nor	  its	  institutions	  can	  avoid	  a	  review	  of	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  measures	  adopted	  by	  them	  are	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  basic	  constitutional	  charter,	  the	  Treaty.”23	  In	  a	  formulation	  it	  has	  regularly	  repeated	  since,	  the	  Court	  held	  in	  Les	  Verts	  that	  “the	  EC	  Treaty	  [establishes]	  a	  complete	  system	  of	  
legal	  remedies	  and	  procedures	  designed	  to	  enable	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  to	  review	  the	  legality	  of	  acts	  of	  the	  institutions.”24	  The	  Court’s	  formulation	  reflects	  a	  fairly	  standard	  conception	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  constitutional	  law,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  principle	  that	  no	  crevice	  of	  public	  power	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  comprehensive	  sweep	  of	  constitutional	  scrutiny.25	  Accordingly,	  the	  Court	  reasoned	  that	  within	  its	  functionally	  delimited	  sphere	  of	  jurisdiction,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  over	  public	  institutions	  is	  seamless	  and	  pervasive,	  just	  like	  that	  of	  a	  conventional	  constitution.	  The	  Court’s	  Les	  Verts	  decision	  made	  constitutional	  language	  all	  but	  unavoidable	  in	  subsequent	  discussions	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  European	  commonwealth.	  In	  the	  ensuing	  decades,	  much	  of	  the	  critical	  debate	  over	  the	  nature	  and	  trajectory	  of	  European	  integration	  has	  taken	  place	  within	  the	  discursive	  parameters	  of	  constitutionalism,	  even	  when	  observers	  contest	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  this	  terminology	  in	  the	  supranational	  context.	  The	  terminological	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  constitutional	  discourse	  among	  European	  jurists	  in	  characterizing	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  significant.	  It	  represents	  the	  conquest	  of	  new	  territory	  for	  legal	  scholars	  in	  a	  disciplinary	  turf	  war	  against	  international	  relations	  scholarship,	  which	  has	  traditionally	  held	  that	  only	  sovereign	  states	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  exert	  violent	  force	  
                                                
21 Federalist No.15 22	  Case	  294/83	  Partie	  Ecologiste	  ‘Les	  Verts’	  v.	  Parliament	  [1986],	  ECR	  1339	  23	  ibid,	  para.	  23	  24	  Les	  Verts,	  para.23	  25	  The	  rule	  of	  law	  is,	  in	  essence,	  what	  Neil	  MacCormick	  calls	  the	  “minimal	  virtue”	  of	  constitutionalism.	  MacCormick,	  Questioning	  Sovereignty,	  103	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“matter,”26	  and	  that	  the	  law,	  either	  as	  a	  factual	  or	  normative	  category,	  is	  purely	  epiphenomenal	  in	  the	  international	  realm.27	  Thus,	  part	  of	  the	  insistence	  on	  constitutional	  terminology	  must	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemic	  empowerment:	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  norms,	  doctrines,	  and	  adjudication	  not	  only	  influences	  state	  “behavior,”	  but	  can	  help	  reconfigure	  the	  unquestioned	  categories	  (such	  as	  interest,	  preference,	  or	  power)	  on	  which	  international	  relations	  scholarship	  is	  built.	  The	  penchant	  for	  describing	  the	  supranational	  enterprise	  in	  constitutional	  	  terms	  did	  not	  long	  remain	  confined	  to	  academic	  and	  legal	  circles.	  The	  start	  of	  a	  more	  assertive	  political	  phase	  of	  integration	  after	  the	  1992	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  generated	  expectations	  that	  after	  many	  decades	  spent	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  public	  debate,	  the	  European	  Union	  might	  finally	  be	  ready	  to	  tread	  a	  constitutional	  path	  similar	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Just	  as	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	  that	  barely	  held	  together	  the	  thirteen	  states	  was	  superseded	  by	  a	  federal	  framework,	  proponents	  of	  a	  federal	  Europe	  hoped	  that	  the	  newly	  inaugurated	  Union	  would	  transform	  from	  the	  pragmatic	  scheme	  of	  cooperation	  among	  member	  states	  into	  a	  polity	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Jurgen	  Habermas	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  transformation	  required	  an	  eponymous	  constitutional	  document,	  which	  would	  help	  democratic	  politics	  to	  finally	  break	  the	  shell	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.28	  Endorsing	  Habermas’s	  project	  in	  a	  celebrated	  2000	  speech,	  the	  then	  German	  foreign	  minister	  Joschka	  Fischer	  argued	  that	  the	  time	  had	  come	  to	  move	  to	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  European	  federation.29	  Both	  of	  these	  appeals	  grounded	  the	  need	  for	  a	  constitution	  for	  the	  EU	  on	  two	  countervailing	  considerations;	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  legitimation	  problems	  created	  by	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  elected	  domestic	  legislatures	  and	  democratically	  accountable	  executives	  to	  supranational	  institutions	  attenuated	  from	  popular	  control,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  persistent	  systemic	  imperatives	  that	  warranted	  the	  expansion	  of	  supranational	  decision-­‐making.	  	  The	  decision	  by	  member	  states	  at	  the	  2001	  European	  Council	  meeting	  in	  Laeken	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  supranational	  constitutional	  document	  stoked	  
                                                
26 As Waltz memorably put it: “National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. 
International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation.” Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979), at 113  
27 For an updated articulation of this position, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 28	  Habermas,	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other,	  161;	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  “Remarks	  on	  Dieter	  Grimm’s	  ‘Does	  Europe	  Need	  a	  Constitution?’,”	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  vol.1	  (1995),	  no.3,	  pp.301-­‐306;	  “Why	  Europe	  Needs	  a	  Constitution,”	  New	  Left	  Review,	  vol.11(2001),	  pp.5-­‐26;	  and	  essays	  in	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  
Other.	  29	  Joschka	  Fischer,	  “From	  Confederacy	  to	  Federation:	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Finality	  of	  European	  Integration,”	  speech	  delivered	  at	  Humboldt	  University	  in	  Berlin,	  12	  May	  2000.	  Fischer	  visibly	  borrowed	  from	  Habermas	  in	  casting	  the	  constitution	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  Europe’s	  democratic	  deficit:	  “These	  three	  reforms—the	  solution	  of	  the	  democracy	  problem	  and	  the	  need	  for	  fundamental	  reordering	  of	  competences	  both	  horizontally,	  i.e.,	  among	  the	  European	  institutions,	  and	  vertically,	  i.e.,	  between	  Europe,	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  regions—will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  succeed	  if	  Europe	  is	  established	  anew	  with	  a	  constitution.	  In	  other	  words,	  through	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  project	  of	  a	  European	  constitution	  centred	  around	  basic,	  human	  and	  civil	  rights,	  an	  equal	  division	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  European	  institutions	  and	  a	  precise	  delineation	  between	  European	  and	  nation-­‐state	  level.”	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federalist	  hopes	  that	  such	  an	  endeavor	  would	  “catalyze”	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  vibrant	  European	  demos.30	  Although	  the	  Council	  tasked	  the	  Convention	  with	  finding	  ways	  to	  “increase	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  transparency	  [and	  efficiency]	  of	  the	  present	  
institutions”	  rather	  than	  fundamentally	  reconfiguring	  those	  institutions,31	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Convention,	  Valery	  Giscard	  d’Estaing,	  was	  quick	  to	  define	  its	  task	  in	  Philadelphian	  terms.	  In	  his	  understanding,	  the	  Convention,	  preceded	  by	  a	  “listening	  phase”	  of	  consultations	  with	  citizens	  and	  civil	  society	  groups,	  was	  meant	  to	  do	  more	  than	  garner	  public	  engagement	  with	  the	  European	  project.	  As	  Giscard	  understood	  it,	  the	  Convention	  was	  meant	  to	  stage	  a	  “constitutional	  moment,”32	  that	  is,	  to	  decisively	  shift	  the	  EU’s	  basis	  of	  legitimation	  across	  the	  intergovernmental	  threshold	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  direct	  popular	  authorization.	   Alas,	  the	  fruit	  of	  the	  Convention’s	  labors,	  the	  equivocally	  entitled	  “Constitutional	  Treaty,”	  was	  summarily	  rejected	  by	  the	  very	  demoi	  whose	  will	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  express,	  even	  if	  the	  referendum	  campaigns	  in	  France	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  were	  fought	  largely	  on	  issues	  other	  than	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  document	  itself.	  When	  the	  constitution-­‐making	  enterprise	  ultimately	  fell	  short	  of	  its	  bombastic	  billing,	  the	  Philadelphian	  refrain	  that	  had	  accompanied	  its	  framing	  contributed	  not	  only	  to	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  disappointment	  but	  heightened	  popular	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EU’s	  democratic	  deficit.	  Meeting	  in	  2007,	  the	  European	  Council	  commissioned	  a	  new	  intergovernmental	  conference	  to	  salvage	  the	  necessary	  institutional	  reforms	  from	  the	  wreckage	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Treaty,	  and	  unceremoniously	  consigned	  the	  rest	  to	  the	  dustbin	  of	  history:	  “The	  constitutional	  concept,	  which	  consisted	  in	  repealing	  all	  existing	  Treaties	  and	  replacing	  them	  by	  a	  single	  text	  called	  ‘Constitution,’	  is	  abandoned.”33	  To	  many,	  the	  failure	  of	  this	  attempt	  at	  democratic	  constitution-­‐making	  was	  hardly	  a	  surprise.	  In	  Weiler’s	  words,	  “if	  there	  is	  no	  demos,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  democracy.”34	  According	  to	  proponents	  of	  the	  “no-­‐demos	  thesis,”	  the	  EU	  does	  not	  generate	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  political	  identification	  among	  citizens,	  and	  therefore	  lacks	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  meaningful	  democratic	  engagement.35	  Although	  supranational	  institutions	  constrain	  states	  or	  help	  to	  resolve	  well-­‐defined	  policy	  problems,	  they	  lack	  the	  allegiance	  of	  “a	  group	  of	  people	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  which	  feels	  sufficiently	  attached	  to	  each	  other	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  democratic	  discourse	  and	  binding	  decision-­‐making.”36	  On	  this	  view,	  domestic	  institutions	  still	  hold	  the	  key	  to	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  command	  the	  attention	  and	  loyalties	  of	  citizens,	  while	  “[n]either	  the	  Commission,	  nor	  the	  EP,	  nor	  the	  ECJ	  are	  understood	  to	  embody	  or	  express	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  cohesive	  political	  community	  to	  rule	  itself	  
                                                30	  Habermas,	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other,	  161	  
31 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken 14-15 December 2001, Annex I, pp.22-23, emphasis 
added. 
32 Bruce Ackerman, We The People. Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1991). 
33 Brussels European Council of 21-22 June 2007, Presidency Conclusions. 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex I, 
I.1, p.15.  
34 Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 337 35	  e.g.	  Lindseth,	  Power	  and	  Legitimacy,	  10	  36	  Lars-­‐Erik	  Cederman,	  “Nationalism	  and	  Bounded	  Integration:	  What	  it	  Would	  Take	  to	  Construct	  a	  European	  Demos,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  vol.7	  (2001),	  no.2,	  pp.139-­‐74,	  144	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through	  institutions	  historically	  constituted	  for	  that	  purpose.”37	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  vibrant	  and	  inclusive	  public	  sphere	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  not	  only	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  constitutional	  rule	  taking	  root	  in	  the	  supranational	  context,38	  but	  also	  ensures	  that	  attempts	  to	  impose	  a	  constitutional	  framework	  on	  the	  EU	  will	  result	  in	  an	  anti-­‐European	  backlash.	  Pace	  Habermas,	  adherents	  of	  this	  view	  insist	  that	  the	  demos	  catalyzes	  the	  constitution,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Without	  it,	  the	  EU’s	  elaborate	  constitution-­‐like	  characteristics	  cannot	  breathe	  democratic	  life	  into	  supranational	  politics.39	  Since	  the	  attempt	  to	  reinvent	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  supranational	  democracy	  by	  staging	  a	  Philadelphian	  moment	  failed,	  some	  of	  the	  certainty	  attending	  the	  use	  of	  constitutional	  terminology	  in	  scholarly	  debate	  has	  ebbed.	  Leading	  the	  charge,	  Peter	  Lindseth	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  a	  category	  mistake	  to	  describe	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  constitutional	  terms	  because:	  	  “[t]he	  legitimation	  of	  supranational	  regulatory	  power	  (its	  ‘mandate,’	  so	  to	  speak)	  has	  never	  been	  successfully	  located	  supranationally…	  Rather,	  it	  has	  been	  located,	  however	  tenuously,	  in	  the	  enabling	  treaties	  themselves,	  akin	  to	  enabling	  legislation	  on	  the	  national	  level,	  empowering	  the	  supranational	  exercise	  of	  regulatory	  discretion	  within	  the	  capacious	  limits	  defined	  by	  those	  treaties.”40	  According	  to	  Lindseth,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  based	  on	  treaties	  ratified	  by	  member	  states	  to	  jointly	  govern	  matters	  of	  common	  interest	  means	  that	  it	  derives	  its	  legitimacy	  from	  democratic	  mechanisms	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  much	  as	  the	  moon	  borrows	  its	  light	  from	  the	  sun.	  By	  contrast,	  constitutional	  authority	  originates	  in	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people;	  it	  is	  original	  rather	  than	  derivative.	  As	  the	  failed	  Constitutional	  Treaty	  demonstrated,	  there	  is	  no	  pouvoir	  constituant	  behind	  the	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  order;	  instead,	  its	  validity	  derives	  from	  the	  assent	  of	  member	  states	  and	  special	  provisions	  contained	  in	  national	  constitutions.	  Therefore,	  member	  states	  retain	  the	  sole	  true	  claim	  to	  the	  title	  “constitutional,”	  while	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  is	  more	  accurately	  understood	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  postwar	  administrative	  state	  that	  complements	  representative	  democracy	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.41	  	  Lindseth	  is	  surely	  correct	  to	  observe	  that	  supranational	  governance	  operates	  largely	  in	  the	  administrative	  mode:	  the	  EU’s	  powers	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	  it	  by	  the	  
                                                37	  Lindseth,	  Power	  and	  Legitimacy,	  28	  38	  Dieter	  Grimm,	  “Does	  Europe	  Need	  a	  Constitution?”,	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.1,	  No.3,	  1995,	  pp.	  282-­‐302	  39	  Habermas’s	  idea	  of	  the	  “catalytic	  constitution”	  espouses	  something	  like	  a	  Haasian	  “spillover”	  logic:	  it	  assumes	  that	  the	  legal	  procedural	  model	  so	  created	  will	  be	  incrementally	  filled	  in	  by	  democratic	  substance.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  constitutionalism	  that	  underpins	  what	  I	  have	  termed	  the	  democratic	  objection	  draws	  (among	  others)	  on	  Habermas’s	  own	  work,	  it	  also	  exposes	  a	  fundamental	  tension	  between	  Habermas’s	  political	  philosophy	  and	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  constitutionalization	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  As	  John	  McCormick	  puts	  it,	  “Habermas	  resorts	  to	  an	  unsubstantiated	  historical	  narrative	  and	  an	  unreflective	  ideational	  construction	  of	  the	  past	  in	  comparison	  with/in	  contrast	  to	  the	  present	  so	  that	  the	  present	  might	  be	  grasped	  more	  facilely.	  That	  Habermas	  engages	  in	  such	  moves	  to	  highlight	  optimistic	  rather	  than	  Weberianly	  pessimistic	  possibilities	  does	  not	  mitigate	  the	  undertheorized	  quality	  of	  the	  moves	  themselves.”	  John	  P.	  McCormick,	  Weber,	  Habermas,	  and	  
Transformations	  of	  the	  European	  State.	  Constitutional,	  social,	  and	  supranational	  democracy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  180	  40	  Lindseth,	  Power	  and	  Legitimacy,	  19	  41	  ibid,	  89	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elected	  representatives	  of	  member	  states;	  it	  exercises	  partially	  autonomous	  authority	  within	  functionally	  specialized	  areas	  of	  policy;	  its	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  privilege	  technical	  expertise	  over	  partisan	  bargaining	  and	  impartiality	  over	  ideology;	  and	  it	  operates	  at	  arm’s	  length	  from	  majoritarian	  control.	  In	  similar	  vein,	  Giandomenico	  Majone	  considers	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  elements	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  domestic	  non-­‐majoritarian	  institutions	  such	  as	  constitutional	  courts,	  central	  banks,	  and	  specialized	  regulatory	  agencies.42	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  possesses	  greater	  political	  power	  and	  significance	  than	  Majone	  seems	  to	  allow,	  Lindseth	  insists	  that	  “supranational	  institutions	  remain	  administrative,	  not	  constitutional.”43	  Although	  the	  Convention	  has	  dealt	  a	  severe	  blow	  to	  the	  attempt	  to	  impose	  a	  model	  of	  democratic	  constitutionalism	  onto	  the	  EU,	  abandoning	  constitutional	  terminology	  altogether	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  administrative	  model	  is	  also	  unconvincing.	  Several	  important	  features	  of	  the	  EU’s	  complex	  institutional	  landscape	  militate	  against	  understanding	  administrative	  and	  constitutional	  modes	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  binary.44	  Since	  very	  early	  on	  in	  the	  history	  of	  European	  integration,	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  supranational	  institutions	  has	  outpaced	  their	  formal	  legal	  mandate,	  straining	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  implied	  by	  the	  administrative	  model.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  the	  treaties,	  the	  European	  Court’s	  maximalist	  interpretations,	  and	  the	  wide	  scope	  and	  high	  stakes	  of	  supranational	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  make	  it	  problematic	  to	  apply	  the	  same	  model	  of	  governance	  to	  the	  EU	  as	  one	  would	  to	  a	  telecommunications	  commission.	  	  Thus,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  EU	  relies	  on	  technocratic	  competence	  and	  attenuated	  forms	  of	  democratic	  oversight	  for	  its	  legitimation,	  it	  resembles	  the	  administrative	  governance	  paradigm.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  its	  competences	  and	  scope	  of	  authority	  are	  too	  complex	  and	  extensive	  to	  subsist	  on	  circuits	  of	  borrowed	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  supplied	  for	  the	  most	  part	  by	  mechanisms	  of	  electoral	  accountability	  located	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  Viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  governance	  tasks	  entrusted	  to	  it,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  institutional	  devices	  it	  uses	  to	  hold	  member	  states	  to	  their	  commitments,	  the	  EU	  is	  more	  usefully	  thought	  of	  as	  constitutional.	  The	  concept	  of	  functional	  constitutionalism	  I	  develop	  in	  this	  chapter	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  registering	  the	  obsolescence	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  administrative	  and	  constitutional	  modes	  of	  authority	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  while	  accounting	  for	  the	  problems	  of	  legitimation	  left	  in	  its	  wake.	  	  
                                                42	  Majone,	  “From	  the	  Positive	  to	  the	  Regulatory	  State,”	  153;	  Giandomenico	  Majone,	  “The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Regulatory	  State	  in	  Europe,”	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy,	  vol.17	  (1994),	  no.	  3,	  pp.77-­‐101,	  84,	  92;	  Majone,	  
The	  European	  Community:	  An	  ‘Independent	  Fourth	  Branch	  of	  Government’?,	  43	  ibid,	  53	  44	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  question	  this	  binary	  on	  a	  conceptual	  level.	  As	  William	  Eskridge	  Jr.	  and	  John	  Ferejohn	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  “administrative	  constitutionalism”	  in	  the	  US	  context,	  whereby	  a	  variety	  of	  statutory	  mechanisms,	  including	  administrative	  agencies,	  fulfill	  a	  constitutional	  role	  by	  fleshing	  out	  lofty	  constitutional	  commitments	  in	  the	  regulatory	  domain	  and	  thereby	  supplementing	  what	  the	  authors	  describe	  as	  the	  US’s	  “old,”	  vague,	  and	  incomplete	  “Large	  ‘C’	  Constitution.”	  See	  Eskridge	  and	  Ferejohn,	  A	  Republic	  of	  Statutes,	  esp.	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	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In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  makes	  two	  argumentative	  moves.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  important	  respects,	  beyond	  the	  formal	  juridical	  characteristics	  outlined	  above,	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  does	  conform	  to	  conventional	  expectations	  of	  a	  constitutional	  regime.	  The	  second	  move	  is	  the	  reverse	  of	  the	  first:	  it	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  important	  respects	  in	  which	  the	  legal	  order	  of	  the	  EU	  suspends,	  modifies,	  or	  qualifies	  the	  traditional	  expectations	  of	  constitutional	  rule.	  In	  particular,	  the	  supranational	  legal	  order	  breaks	  with	  the	  threefold	  assumption	  that	  constitutional	  authority	  must	  be	  comprehensive,	  exclusive,	  and	  fully	  autonomous,	  and	  instead	  exerts	  a	  form	  of	  authority	  that	  is	  functionally	  specialized,	  pluralistic,	  and	  only	  partially	  autonomous.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  twin	  analytical	  moves	  are	  intended	  to	  show	  that	  the	  EU	  introduces	  a	  recognizable	  variation	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  constitutional	  rule,	  one	  that	  I	  term	  functional	  constitutionalism.	  Beyond	  giving	  an	  interpretive	  account	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  this	  proposed	  sub-­‐category	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  detach	  the	  idea	  of	  constitutionalism	  from	  the	  background	  condition	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  The	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  system	  has	  already	  accomplished	  this	  in	  practice,	  but	  constitutional	  theory	  has	  yet	  to	  catch	  up.	  An	  alternative	  understanding	  of	  constitutionalism	  is	  therefore	  long	  overdue.	  	  	  	  	  
(i) Why	  constitutional?	  
	   Interestingly,	  while	  critics	  have	  rightly	  characterized	  Giscard’s	  appeal	  to	  a	  Philadelphian	  narrative	  of	  popular	  constitution-­‐making	  as	  a	  model	  for	  the	  EU	  as	  misguided,	  they	  have	  justified	  their	  critique	  by	  using	  the	  very	  same	  narrative.	  What	  remains	  to	  be	  questioned,	  however,	  is	  whether	  the	  Philadelphian	  narrative	  is	  the	  right	  frame	  for	  critically	  engaging	  with	  the	  EU.	  Without	  questioning	  the	  normative	  desirability	  of	  a	  democratic	  conception	  of	  constitutionalism,	  I	  will	  enumerate	  the	  reasons	  why	  constitutionalism	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  only	  apposite	  category	  for	  the	  entity	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  become.	  I	  also	  will	  not	  contest	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  conceived	  and	  created	  by	  member	  states	  as	  a	  scheme	  of	  delegated	  authority,	  nor	  will	  I	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  hoodwinked	  them	  into	  surrendering	  the	  mantle	  of	  sovereignty,	  much	  less	  that	  the	  EU	  now	  wears	  that	  mantle.	  What	  I	  will	  argue	  is	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  not	  or	  no	  longer	  usefully	  imagined	  as	  a	  discrete	  tier	  of	  governance	  that	  floats	  above	  national	  governments	  or	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  coordination	  among	  them;	  it	  has	  become	  deeply	  enmeshed	  with	  domestic	  institutions	  through	  a	  process	  of	  state	  transformation.45	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  contended	  that	  unlike	  natural	  categories,	  social	  science	  concepts	  are	  historically	  contingent	  and	  politically	  conditioned.	  Concepts	  such	  as	  constitutionalism,	  democracy,	  or	  citizenship	  cannot	  simply	  be	  taken	  off	  a	  shelf,	  since	  they	  are	  thoroughly	  conditioned	  by	  the	  political	  and	  institutional	  forms	  that	  instantiate	  them.	  For	  this	  reason,	  any	  attempt	  to	  use	  them	  in	  a	  novel	  context	  cannot	  simply	  be	  an	  exercise	  in	  application,	  but	  must	  involve	  conceptual	  
                                                
45 Christopher J. Bickerton, European Integration. From Nation-States to Member States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 
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adjustment.	  Having	  emerged	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  territorial	  state,	  the	  concept	  of	  constitutionalism	  retains	  its	  imprint.	  Transplanting	  the	  Philadelphian	  narrative	  of	  constitutional	  rule	  in	  the	  supranational	  context	  in	  either	  a	  critical	  or	  aspirational	  vein	  is	  therefore	  tantamount	  to	  treating	  a	  social	  science	  category	  like	  a	  natural,	  unchanging	  one.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  problem,	  I	  proposed	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  the	  definitional	  question,	  which	  was	  to	  contextualize	  the	  idea	  of	  constitutionalism	  by	  examining	  the	  major	  justificatory	  discourses	  that	  have	  shaped	  and	  sustained	  its	  modern	  practice.	  That	  exercise	  revealed	  that	  while	  democratic	  self-­‐rule	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  purposes	  associated	  with	  constitutionalism,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  The	  fact	  that	  democracy	  often	  requires	  a	  constitutional	  framework	  to	  function	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  constitutional	  systems	  are	  necessarily	  democratic.	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  legitimate,	  most	  desirable,	  or	  most	  stable	  constitutional	  systems	  are	  those	  that	  establish	  the	  strongest	  links	  between	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power	  and	  the	  will	  of	  the	  demos,	  but	  it	  is	  unpersuasive	  to	  move	  from	  this	  normative	  claim	  to	  a	  definitional	  one.	  The	  machinery	  of	  constitutionalism	  can	  be	  deployed	  to	  advance	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  teloi	  beyond	  that	  of	  democratic	  self-­‐rule.	  For	  instance,	  a	  spate	  of	  recent	  scholarship	  attends	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  constitutional	  rule	  has	  been	  used	  to	  thwart	  popular	  will,	  undermine	  individual	  rights,	  or	  perpetuate	  illiberal	  or	  hegemonic	  practices.46	  	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  no-­‐demos	  thesis	  is	  correct	  that	  the	  EU	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  democratic	  model	  of	  constitutional	  rule,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  constitutional	  system	  derives	  from	  the	  will	  of	  a	  self-­‐governing	  demos.	  A	  legal	  system	  that	  does	  not	  establish	  a	  close	  enough	  correspondence	  between	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people	  as	  expressed	  through	  democratic	  procedures	  that	  the	  laws	  that	  bind	  citizens	  fails	  to	  meet	  this	  criterion.	  If	  citizens	  cannot	  regard	  the	  constitution	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  collectively	  agreed	  terms	  of	  their	  union,	  they	  can	  regard	  it	  as	  an	  “imperial	  yoke”	  that	  stifles	  their	  civic	  autonomy.47	  Each	  of	  these	  are	  meritorious	  grounds	  for	  critiquing	  the	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  system.	  Despite	  its	  normative	  appeal,	  however,	  the	  democratic	  model	  of	  constitutional	  rule	  that	  informs	  the	  no-­‐
demos	  thesis	  captures	  only	  one	  of	  the	  many	  possible	  sources	  of	  constitutional	  authority.	  Such	  alternative	  sources	  include	  principles	  of	  natural	  or	  scriptural	  justice,	  appeals	  to	  the	  antiquity,	  custom,	  and	  inherited	  political	  structures,	  or	  arguments	  about	  stability	  and	  public	  order,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  provide	  justifications	  for	  elevating	  certain	  fundamental	  norms	  above	  democratic	  control.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  
                                                46	  Alexander	  Somek,	  “Authoritarian	  Constitutionalism:	  Austrian	  constitutional	  doctrine	  1933	  to	  1938	  and	  its	  legacy,”	  in	  Christian	  Joerges	  &	  Navraj	  Singh	  Ghaleigh	  (eds),	  Darker	  Legacies	  of	  Law	  in	  Europe	  (Oxford:	  Hart,	  2003);	  Tom	  Ginsburg	  and	  Alberto	  Simpser	  (eds),	  Constitutions	  in	  Authoritarian	  
Regimes	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  Turkuler	  Isiksel,	  “Between	  Text	  and	  Context:	  Turkey’s	  tradition	  of	  authoritarian	  constitutionalism,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Constitutional	  Law	  11:3	  (July	  2013),	  pp.702-­‐26.	  On	  the	  role	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  authoritarian	  contexts,	  see	  Tamir	  Moustafa	  and	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  “Introduction:	  The	  Functions	  of	  Courts	  in	  Authoritarian	  Politics,”	  in	  Tom	  Ginsburg	  and	  Tamir	  Moustafa	  (eds),	  Rule	  by	  Law:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Courts	  in	  Authoritarian	  Regimes	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  47	  James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995),	  5	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the	  no-­‐demos	  thesis	  is	  essentially	  a	  normative	  claim	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  bad	  constitutional	  system	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  democratic	  standard	  of	  constitutional	  legitimacy.	  What	  it	  does	  not	  establish	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  in	  constitutional	  terms	  at	  all.	  	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  why	  reserving	  the	  term	  “constitution”	  for	  documents	  that	  emerge	  through	  acts	  of	  popular	  self-­‐constitution	  is	  overly	  restrictive.	  First,	  although	  democratic	  constitution-­‐making	  is	  a	  fine	  ideal,	  as	  an	  empirical	  matter,	  it	  is	  a	  criterion	  that	  few	  existing	  constitutional	  orders	  can	  meet.	  More	  fundamentally,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  democratic	  quality	  of	  a	  constitution	  hinges	  on	  whether	  it	  was	  drafted	  and	  ratified	  through	  processes	  involving	  high	  levels	  of	  popular	  participation	  (such	  as	  referenda,	  constituent	  assemblies,	  social	  mobilization,	  revolutionary	  upheavals,	  and	  the	  like).	  A	  constitutional	  regime	  imposed	  by	  a	  foreign	  power	  or	  a	  hegemonic	  elite	  can	  evolve	  into	  a	  democratic	  one	  if	  it	  puts	  into	  place	  effective	  and	  inclusive	  mechanisms	  of	  electoral	  representation,	  sets	  forth	  meaningful	  procedures	  of	  constitutional	  amendment,	  and	  garners	  popular	  engagement	  and	  allegiance	  (the	  
Grundgesetz	  is	  a	  good	  example).	  	  Second,	  viewing	  the	  constitution	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people	  reflects	  the	  statist	  cast	  within	  which	  the	  constitutional	  ideal	  has	  evolved.	  Viewed	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  popular	  sovereignty,	  constitutional	  authority	  must	  be	  comprehensive,	  exclusive,	  and	  autonomous:	  comprehensive	  because	  all	  exercises	  of	  political	  authority	  within	  a	  given	  body	  politic	  ought	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  constitution;	  exclusive	  because	  the	  constitution	  cannot	  derive	  its	  authority	  from	  any	  other	  legally	  constituted	  source;	  and	  autonomous	  because	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people	  is	  subject	  to	  no	  other	  source	  of	  authority.	  Under	  this	  conception,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  distinction	  between	  sovereign	  and	  constitutional	  authority;	  the	  former	  is	  stipulated	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  latter.	   If	  a	  constitutional	  order	  expresses	  the	  exclusive	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  political	  community,	  the	  European	  Union	  clearly	  cannot	  be	  considered	  a	  constitutional	  system.	  However,	  its	  member	  states	  also	  seem	  to	  increasingly	  fall	  short	  of	  that	  precondition.	  The	  assumption	  of	  a	  world	  made	  up	  of	  discrete,	  self-­‐contained	  and	  self-­‐validating	  constitutional	  orders	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  empirical	  reality	  if	  it	  ever	  was.48	  It	  is	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  trace	  the	  authority	  exercised	  by	  global	  governance	  institutions	  to	  a	  single,	  comprehensive	  jurisdiction	  or	  to	  any	  single	  “metaprinciple	  of	  authority.”49	  In	  fact,	  the	  term	  “governance”	  itself,	  in	  contrast	  to	  “government,”	  conveys	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  who	  or	  what	  is	  doing	  the	  governing.	  Contemporary	  legal	  systems	  both	  domestic	  and	  transnational	  are	  linked	  
                                                48	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  not.	  For	  a	  representative	  sampling	  of	  the	  reasons	  why,	  see	  especially	  the	  contributions	  in	  Hent	  Kalmo	  and	  Quentin	  Skinner	  (eds),	  Sovereignty	  in	  Fragments.	  The	  Past,	  
Present	  and	  Future	  of	  a	  Contested	  Concept	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  Also	  see	  Krasner,	  Sovereignty.	  Organized	  Hypocrisy;	  Lauren	  Benton,	  A	  Search	  for	  Sovereignty:	  Law	  and	  
Geography	  in	  European	  Empires,	  1400-­‐1900	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010);	  Anthony	  Anghie,	  “Finding	  the	  Peripheries:	  Sovereignty	  and	  Colonialism	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  International	  Law,”	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  Journal,	  vol.40	  (1999),	  pp.1-­‐81	  49	  Neil	  Walker,	  “Beyond	  Boundary	  Disputes	  and	  Basic	  Grids:	  Mapping	  the	  Global	  Disorder	  of	  Normative	  Orders,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Constitutional	  Law,	  vol.6	  (2008),	  no.3-­‐4,	  pp.	  373-­‐396,	  at	  376	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to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways:	  sovereign	  states	  are	  subject	  to	  jus	  cogens	  norms	  and	  accommodate	  competing	  claims	  raised	  from	  within	  other	  jurisdictions;50	  they	  enter	  into	  mutual	  obligations	  under	  public	  international	  law;	  they	  abide	  by	  the	  judicial	  principle	  of	  comity	  and	  assume	  private	  and	  public	  law	  obligations	  to	  private	  actors	  such	  as	  business	  corporations;	  constitutional	  ideas	  cross-­‐pollinate	  among	  different	  systems.51	  In	  extreme	  cases,	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  constitution	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  enough	  to	  establish	  the	  authoritativeness	  of	  a	  particular	  rule;	  rather,	  national	  constitutions	  might	  need	  to	  stake	  their	  claim	  to	  validity	  among	  other	  competing	  systems	  and	  forms	  of	  law.	  Even	  within	  the	  domestic	  context,	  therefore,	  the	  paradigm	  of	  comprehensive,	  exclusive,	  and	  fully	  autonomous	  constitutional	  authority	  is	  no	  longer	  adequate.52	  Much	  less	  can	  it	  capture	  the	  forms	  of	  constitutional	  rule	  that	  many	  contemporary	  international	  regimes	  practice	  without	  claiming	  the	  attribute	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  Once	  we	  distinguish	  between	  sovereign	  and	  constitutional	  authority,	  by	  contrast,	  we	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  think	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  either	  an	  emanation	  of	  domestic	  legal	  systems	  or	  as	  sovereign	  over	  them.	  As	  Cohen	  observes,	  “[t]he	  non-­‐derivative	  character	  of	  legal	  supranationalism	  is	  as	  important	  to	  grasp	  as	  the	  non-­‐derivative	  character	  of	  domestic	  constitutions,”	  not	  least	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  real	  shifts	  in	  normative	  authority	  that	  unconditional	  or	  absolutist	  conceptions	  of	  sovereign	  power	  tend	  to	  occlude.53	  The	  constitutional	  perspective,	  shorn	  of	  its	  sovereigntist	  cast,	  captures	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  legal	  form	  and	  function.	  From	  a	  different	  quarter,	  critics	  have	  decried	  the	  inflationary	  use	  of	  constitutional	  terminology	  in	  relation	  to	  international	  institutions,	  particularly	  economic	  ones,	  as	  giving	  these	  institutions	  an	  aura	  of	  legitimacy	  that	  they	  otherwise	  lack.54	  This	  is	  an	  important	  critique,	  but	  it	  cuts	  both	  ways.	  Describing	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  constitutional	  places	  it	  under	  a	  greater	  burden	  of	  legitimation,	  because	  it	  captures	  the	  expansive	  scope	  of	  its	  power	  in	  comparison	  to	  less	  consequential	  political	  forms.	  By	  contrast,	  casting	  it	  as	  an	  international	  organization	  or	  an	  administrative	  agency	  understates	  the	  highly	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  decisions	  made	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.	  Put	  differently,	  describing	  a	  polity	  as	  constitutional	  does	  not	  let	  it	  off	  the	  hook	  in	  normative	  terms;	  to	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  a	  reminder	  that	  it	  must	  be	  held	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  legitimacy.	  As	  Michel	  Rosenfeld	  writes,	  it	  is	  “more	  profitable…	  to	  note	  the	  constitutional	  defects”	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  “in	  comparison	  with	  the	  allocation	  of	  powers	  in	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  nation-­‐
                                                50	  For	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  dense	  subterranean	  links	  between	  domestic	  constitutional	  norms	  and	  norms	  that	  are	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  external	  to	  the	  domestic	  order,	  see	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  “Partly	  Laws	  
Common	  to	  All	  Mankind”:	  Foreign	  Law	  in	  American	  Courts	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  51	  Sujit	  Choudhry	  (ed.),	  The	  Migration	  of	  Constitutional	  Ideas	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  52	  MacCormick,	  Questioning	  Sovereignty,	  esp.	  ch.8	  53	  Jean	  Cohen,	  “Sovereignty	  in	  the	  context	  of	  globalization:	  a	  constitutional	  pluralist	  perspective,”	  in	  Samantha	  Besson	  and	  John	  Tasioulas	  (eds),	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  at	  273	  
54 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Legitimacy through ‘Higher Law’? Why constitutionalizing the 
WTO is a step too far,” in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), The Role of the Judge in 
International Trade Regulation: Experience and lessons for the WTO (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2003) 
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state	  parliamentary	  democracy	  from	  a	  critical	  constitutional	  standpoint	  than	  from	  a	  perspective	  that	  stipulates	  that	  the	  ideals	  of	  constitutionalism	  are	  inapposite	  when	  considering	  the	  EU.”55	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  risk	  more	  by	  shying	  away	  from	  constitutional	  terminology	  than	  by	  using	  it,	  but	  we	  also	  miss	  an	  important	  opportunity	  to	  think	  about	  how	  constitutionalism	  may	  look	  beyond	  its	  statist	  cast.	  Perhaps	  most	  important	  of	  the	  considerations	  that	  speak	  in	  favor	  of	  taking	  the	  EU’s	  constitutional	  features	  seriously	  is	  that	  however	  else	  it	  may	  be	  defined,	  a	  constitutional	  system	  is	  constitutive;	  it	  lays	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  political	  community.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  EU	  appears	  at	  first	  glance	  to	  be	  an	  addendum	  to	  the	  state	  system	  since	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  nexus	  of	  revocable	  agreements	  among	  states.	  Besides,	  at	  no	  point	  in	  its	  history	  has	  any	  member	  state	  announced	  any	  intention	  to	  relinquish	  its	  primacy	  as	  a	  political	  unit	  to	  the	  European	  political	  order.	  Still,	  this	  definition	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  constitutive	  order	  contains	  remnants	  of	  an	  eighteenth	  century	  revolutionary	  imaginary,	  according	  to	  which	  a	  constitutive	  act	  must	  be	  one	  that	  dramatically	  sweeps	  away	  of	  the	  ancien	  regime	  and	  replaces	  it	  with	  a	  novus	  
ordo	  saeclorum.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  radical	  constitutional	  shifts	  tend	  to	  occur	  in	  an	  evolutionary,	  rather	  than	  revolutionary,	  manner.	  When,	  precisely,	  did	  the	  American	  states	  cease	  to	  be	  sovereign,	  or	  agree	  to	  such	  cession?	  When	  did	  Britain	  become	  a	  democracy?	  When	  did	  Russia	  stop	  being	  one?	  When	  did	  France	  revert	  to	  being	  a	  nation-­‐state	  rather	  than	  an	  empire?	  In	  each	  case,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  constitutive	  shift	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  community,	  but	  it	  is	  artificial,	  not	  to	  say	  counterfactual,	  to	  assign	  a	  revolutionary	  watershed	  to	  each.	  Similarly,	  European	  integration	  has	  engendered	  a	  transformation	  that	  is	  of	  constitutional	  scale,	  no	  less	  for	  its	  incremental	  trajectory	  and	  lack	  of	  an	  eponymous	  document.	  As	  Craig	  writes,	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  has	  evolved	  from	  “a	  relationship	  binding	  upon	  the	  states	  qua	  states,	  to	  an	  integrated	  legal	  order	  that	  confers	  rights	  and	  obligations	  on	  private	  parties,	  and	  one	  in	  which	  the	  controls	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  public	  power	  are	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  those	  found	  in	  nation	  states.”56	  	  Having	  been	  called	  into	  existence	  by	  sovereign	  nation-­‐states,	  the	  European	  integration	  project	  has	  fundamentally	  reconstituted	  them	  in	  turn.	  The	  EU’s	  constituent	  units	  have	  not	  ceased	  to	  be	  states,	  but	  they	  have	  become	  member	  states,	  which	  Bickerton	  characterizes	  as	  a	  “distinctive	  kind	  of	  state	  where	  national	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  concert	  with	  others”	  and	  “whose	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  inseparable	  from	  pan-­‐European-­‐level	  cooperation.”57	  Much	  as	  marriage	  transforms	  two	  unattached	  individuals	  into	  members	  of	  a	  new	  social	  unit,	  EU	  membership	  has	  led	  states	  to	  “understand	  their	  power	  and	  identity	  as	  dependent	  upon	  their	  belonging	  to	  a	  wider	  group	  or	  community.”58	  EU	  law	  is	  constitutive	  not	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  establishing	  a	  supranational	  institutional	  and	  normative	  structure,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  occasioned	  far-­‐reaching	  institutional,	  legal,	  social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  transformations	  within	  its	  member	  states.	  Prompted	  most	  recently	  by	  the	  
                                                55	  Michel	  Rosenfeld,	  “Is	  Global	  Constitutionalism	  Meaningful	  or	  Desirable?”,	  European	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  forthcoming.	  
56 Paul Craig, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union,” European Law Journal, vol.7 
(2001), no.2, pp.125-50, 128. 
57 Bickerton, European Integration. From Nation-States to Member States, 4, 49 
58 Ibid., 12. The marriage metaphor is mine. 
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euro	  crisis,	  member	  states	  have	  candidly	  acknowledged	  that	  rolling	  back	  this	  prominent	  feature	  of	  European	  integration	  would	  not	  simply	  break	  a	  supranational	  agreement,	  but	  would	  scramble	  all	  aspects	  of	  their	  domestic	  social	  and	  economic	  circumstances.	  	  As	  a	  composite	  polity	  that	  is	  embedded	  within	  member	  states	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  
above	  them,	  the	  EU	  not	  only	  shapes	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  policy	  options	  available	  to	  member	  states,	  but	  has	  also	  profoundly	  altered	  their	  domestic	  constitutional	  systems.59	  EU	  law	  weaves	  together	  supranational,	  national,	  and	  sub-­‐national	  norms	  and	  applies	  sophisticated	  tools	  to	  smooth	  the	  resulting	  snags.60	  Supranational	  governance	  in	  Europe	  is	  constitutive	  because	  it	  creates	  a	  new	  configuration	  of	  political	  authority	  all	  the	  way	  down.	  While	  none	  of	  the	  transformations	  occasioned	  by	  European	  integration	  are	  irreversible,	  much	  less	  inevitable,	  they	  are	  extensive	  and	  significant.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  are	  constitutive	  in	  nature.	  	  	  
(ii) Why	  “functional”?	  
	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  higher	  order	  norms	  that	  constrain,	  shape,	  and	  regulate	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Unlike	  most	  contemporary	  constitutional	  systems,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  democratic	  pattern	  of	  justification.	  Rather,	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  claim	  to	  enable	  the	  effective	  exercise	  of	  public	  power	  in	  policy	  areas	  designated	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  novel	  claim	  of	  constitutional	  legitimacy,	  this	  
                                                59	  To	  point	  out	  some	  well-­‐known	  examples:	  In	  the	  Simmenthal	  II	  case	  of	  1978,	  the	  ECJ	  authorized	  lower	  courts	  to	  invalidate	  domestic	  statute	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  conflict	  with	  European	  law,	  thereby	  overriding	  the	  Italian	  Constitution’s	  prohibition	  against	  judicial	  review	  by	  lower	  courts.	  See	  Case	  106/77,	  Amministrazione	  delle	  Finanze	  dello	  Stato	  v.	  Simmenthal	  SpA	  	  [1978]	  ECR	  629.	  In	  its	  1996	  
Factortame	  judgment,	  the	  ECJ	  arguably	  went	  further.	  As	  Mitchell	  Lasser	  describes	  it,	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  “the	  ‘full,	  effective	  judicial	  protection’	  of	  Community	  rights	  justifies	  overriding	  the	  most	  basic	  premises	  of	  national	  constitutional	  law	  and	  separation	  powers	  doctrine:	  it	  requires	  Member	  State	  courts	  to	  overturn	  national	  legislation	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  –	  and	  therefore	  represents	  an	  ‘obstacle’	  to	  –	  Community	  law,	  even	  in	  those	  legal	  systems	  that	  do	  not	  grant	  such	  powers	  of	  review	  to	  
their	  judiciaries.”	  (Lasser,	  Judicial	  Deliberations,	  at	  225;	  Joined	  cases	  C-­‐46/93	  and	  48/93,	  Brasserie	  du	  
Pêcheur	  SA	  v	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland	  and	  The	  Queen	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐1029,	  para.33)	  The	  British	  House	  of	  Lords,	  who	  had	  sent	  the	  original	  reference	  to	  the	  ECJ,	  accepted	  that	  the	  UK’s	  membership	  in	  the	  EC	  necessitated	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  Community	  law,	  which	  in	  turn	  required	  curtailing	  the	  implied	  repeal	  (lex	  posterior)	  doctrine	  which	  had	  hitherto	  been	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  British	  system	  of	  parliamentary	  sovereignty.	  	  See	  House	  of	  Lords,	  Factortame	  
Ltd.	  and	  others	  v.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport	  [1991]	  1	  AC	  603.	  Also	  see	  Miguel	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  “The	  importance	  of	  being	  called	  a	  constitution:	  Constitutional	  authority	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  constitutionalism,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Constitutional	  Law,	  vol.3	  (2005),	  no.3,	  pp.332-­‐356,	  at	  339-­‐340	  60	  In	  the	  present	  work,	  I	  set	  aside	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  EU	  counts	  as	  a	  federal	  state,	  a	  federal	  non-­‐state,	  or	  a	  confederation.	  On	  this	  question,	  see	  Jean	  Cohen’s	  compelling	  theory	  of	  the	  federation	  understood	  “as	  a	  union	  of	  states	  and	  peoples”	  that	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  state,	  which	  draws	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Olivier	  Beaud’s	  conception	  of	  federalism.	  See	  Jean	  Cohen,	  Globalization	  
and	  sovereignty.	  Rethinking	  legality,	  legitimacy	  and	  constitutionalism	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  85,	  and	  ch.2	  more	  broadly.	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pragmatic	  pattern	  of	  justification	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  some	  of	  the	  earliest	  instances	  of	  sovereign	  commitment.	  The	  primary	  purpose	  for	  which	  constitutional	  rules	  are	  valued	  may	  be	  that	  they	  enable	  the	  state	  to	  perform	  various	  tasks	  it	  might	  otherwise	  be	  hampered	  from	  doing,	  such	  as	  securing	  cheap	  credit,	  encouraging	  private	  industry,	  or	  pacifying	  sectarian	  struggle.	  Unlike	  the	  democratic	  pattern	  of	  justification,	  furthermore,	  the	  pragmatic	  logic	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  composite	  and	  multi-­‐leveled	  forms	  of	  political	  ordering.	  I	  will	  highlight	  three	  elements	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order,	  including	  its	  functional	  specialization,	  teleological	  fixity,	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  a	  claim	  to	  effective	  government	  as	  the	  key	  features	  that	  make	  this	  a	  distinctive	  model	  of	  constitutional	  rule,	  which	  I	  term	  functional	  
constitutionalism.	  I	  will	  also	  explain	  why	  these	  elements	  distinguish	  functional	  constitutionalism	  from	  democratic	  and	  rights-­‐based	  models	  that	  inform	  most	  existing	  constitutional	  surveys	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  First,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  differentiate	  between	  several	  settled	  connotations	  of	  the	  term	  “functionalism”	  and	  the	  meaning	  I	  hope	  to	  convey	  by	  it.	  In	  the	  EU	  context,	  functionalism	  (or	  more	  accurately,	  neofunctionalism)	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  prominent	  but	  contested	  research	  program	  inaugurated	  and	  later	  critiqued	  by	  Ernst	  Haas.61	  Though	  they	  come	  in	  many	  varieties,	  neofunctionalist	  accounts	  privilege	  the	  agency	  of	  supranational	  institutions	  and	  the	  shifting	  loyalties	  of	  grassroots	  political	  actors	  to	  explain	  the	  gradual	  transfer	  of	  sovereignty	  away	  from	  member	  states.62	  As	  a	  broader	  explanatory	  paradigm	  in	  social	  science,	  functionalist	  patterns	  of	  explanation	  assume	  that	  “specialized	  structures	  will	  evolve	  to	  perform	  new	  tasks	  or	  to	  fulfill	  new	  needs	  as	  these	  arise.”63	  My	  argument	  about	  functional	  constitutionalism	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  causal	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  sort;	  it	  is	  not	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  explain	  why	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  system	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  has.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  an	  interpretive	  and	  critical	  account	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  combines	  an	  array	  of	  familiar	  and	  novel	  constitutional	  features.	  I	  use	  the	  qualifier	  “functional”	  to	  convey	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  deeper	  pattern	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  purposiveness	  embodied	  by	  the	  EU’s	  constitutional	  order.	  This	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  excavating	  the	  ends	  and	  values	  sedimented	  into	  the	  EU’s	  normative	  structure.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  it	  remains	  agnostic	  on	  the	  question	  of	  which	  empirical	  factors	  might	  explain	  that	  particular	  pattern.	  It	  neither	  presumes	  nor	  challenges	  the	  empirical	  value	  of	  functionalist	  or	  neofunctionalist	  accounts	  of	  European	  integration.	  	  Second,	  the	  language	  of	  functionalism	  and	  governmental	  effectiveness	  is	  substantively	  underdetermined.	  It	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  outcomes	  might	  count	  as	  effective	  government,	  and	  what	  the	  proper	  gauge	  for	  such	  judgments	  might	  be.	  I	  attempt	  to	  remedy	  this	  inevitable	  vagueness	  by	  distinguishing	  functionalist	  patterns	  
                                                
61 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, [1958] 2004); and later, Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of 
Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For a friendly overview of 
what is living and what is dead in neofunctionalist integration theory, see Philippe C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. 
Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol.12 (2005), no.2, 
pp.255-72 
62 See especially, Haas, The Uniting of Europe, ch.1 
63 John	  Gerard	  Ruggie,	  “Collective	  Goods	  and	  Future	  International	  Collaboration,”	  American	  Political	  
Science	  Review,	  vol.66	  (1972),	  no.3,	  pp.874-­‐893,	  at	  875 
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of	  legitimation	  from	  democratic	  and	  rights-­‐based	  patterns.	  Where	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  organizing	  the	  exercise	  of	  public	  power	  is	  justified	  with	  reference	  not	  to	  its	  conduciveness	  to	  individual	  liberty	  or	  to	  participatory	  government,	  but	  to	  the	  epistemic	  quality	  of	  the	  decisions	  made	  or	  their	  superior	  administration,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  a	  functionalist	  mode	  of	  legitimation	  is	  at	  work.	  Most	  such	  instances	  will	  make	  concrete	  reference	  to	  a	  certain	  telos	  to	  be	  achieved,	  such	  as	  wealth	  maximization,	  public	  order	  and	  safety,	  efficient	  use	  of	  scarce	  resources,	  or	  some	  other	  vector	  of	  the	  public	  interest.	  As	  important,	  functionalist	  justifications	  assume	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  truly	  public	  interest:	  typically,	  the	  outcome	  in	  question	  will	  be	  justified	  either	  as	  making	  everyone	  better	  off	  or,	  at	  least,	  leaving	  no	  one	  worse	  off.	  The	  1957	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  aimed	  to	  pursue	  one	  such	  outcome	  in	  particular	  through	  cooperation	  between	  member	  states:	  that	  of	  generating	  economic	  prosperity	  through	  market	  integration.64	  Although	  the	  forces	  of	  “creative	  destruction”	  unleashed	  by	  market	  integration	  would	  inevitably	  make	  less	  competitive	  sectors	  worse	  off,	  the	  Treaty	  system	  offered	  many	  ways	  of	  compensating	  the	  disadvantaged,	  whether	  through	  cohesion	  funds,	  free	  movement	  of	  labor,	  agricultural	  subsidies,	  and	  the	  like.	  Over	  time,	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  amassed	  a	  formidable	  portfolio	  of	  policy	  competences,	  “[t]he	  enhanced	  effectiveness	  generated	  by	  the	  supranational	  regulation	  of	  transnational	  economic	  exchange,”	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  competitive,	  integrated,	  and	  expanding	  market	  in	  goods,	  services,	  and	  capital,	  “represents	  an	  important	  legitimizing	  function	  of	  supranationalism.”65	  Put	  differently,	  the	  promise	  of	  economic	  prosperity,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  public	  goods	  associated	  with	  an	  integrated	  marketplace,	  is	  the	  primary	  justification	  for	  the	  EU’s	  claim	  to	  bind	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens.	  By	  way	  of	  contrast,	  consider	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  particular	  nation-­‐states	  as	  political	  units	  is	  rarely	  justified	  in	  such	  a	  narrow,	  purposive	  manner:	  Swedes	  desire	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  Sweden	  not	  predominantly	  because	  it	  makes	  them	  wealthier	  or	  safer	  or	  better	  administered	  than	  they	  otherwise	  would	  be,	  but	  because	  it	  best	  represents	  their	  political	  unity	  as	  a	  people.	  Although	  extreme	  economic	  circumstances	  may	  trigger	  separatist	  movements,	  states	  tend	  to	  command	  a	  much	  more	  wide-­‐ranging	  discourse	  of	  justification	  than	  the	  functionalist	  discourse	  that	  sustains	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  Third,	  particularly	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  US	  comparative	  constitutional	  analysis,	  functionalism	  refers	  to	  an	  approach	  that	  accounts	  for	  variation	  among	  political	  institutions	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  problems	  or	  imperatives	  of	  governance	  to	  which	  they	  respond.66	  Understood	  in	  this	  way,	  functionalism	  is	  an	  epistemic	  
                                                64	  On	  the	  economic	  focus	  of	  EU	  law,	  see,	  among	  others,	  Miguel	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  We	  the	  Court:	  The	  
European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  European	  Economic	  Constitution	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  1998);	  Christian	  Joerges	  and	  Michelle	  Everson,	  “Law,	  economics	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  constitutionalization	  of	  Europe”,	  in	  Erik	  Oddvar	  Eriksen,	  John	  Erik	  Fossum,	  and	  Augustin	  Jose	  Menendez	  (eds),	  Developing	  a	  
Constitution	  for	  Europe	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2004).	  
65 ibid, 402 
66 Mark Tushnet, “The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,” Yale Law Journal, vol.108 
(1999), no.6, pp. 1125-1309, 1238. For a critique of the functionalist approach, see Ruti Teitel, 
“Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age,” Harvard Law Review, vol.117 (2004), no.8, pp. 2570-
2596 (arguing that a functionalist analysis of constitutionalism is problematic insofar as “a shared 
understanding of the aims of constitutionalism… has not yet emerged.” 2576) 
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method,	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  knower	  rather	  than	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  known.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  term	  functionalism	  as	  it	  is	  used	  here	  is	  a	  guiding	  characteristic	  of	  the	  constitutional	  order	  itself,	  rather	  than	  an	  analytical	  tool	  with	  which	  to	  understand	  it.	  Finally,	  I	  do	  not	  use	  the	  phrase	  functional	  constitutionalism	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  functional	  analog	  to	  a	  constitutional	  system,	  or	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  approximates	  such	  constitutional	  features	  as	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  norms,	  a	  regime	  of	  individual	  rights,	  or	  a	  system	  of	  judicial	  review.	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	  both	  more	  and	  less	  than	  this:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  simply	  analogous	  to	  a	  constitutional	  regime;	  it	  is	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  constitutional	  regime.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  wish	  to	  go	  beyond	  establishing	  resemblances	  between	  domestic	  and	  supranational	  constitutional	  practice,	  and	  use	  the	  term	  “functional”	  to	  convey	  the	  latter’s	  distinctive	  features.	  	  Having	  pointed	  out	  what	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  by	  describing	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  system	  of	  
functional	  constitutionalism,	  let	  me	  move	  on	  to	  a	  positive	  articulation	  of	  the	  argument.	  To	  my	  mind,	  this	  phrase	  captures	  three	  distinctive	  elements	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  that	  unlike	  domestic	  constitutions,	  which	  govern	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  public	  power	  within	  the	  body	  politic,	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  is	  functionally	  specialized.	  Second,	  it	  is	  framed	  around	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  objectives	  having	  to	  do	  with	  market	  integration;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  espouses	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  teleology	  that	  is	  insulated	  from	  revision.	  Third,	  its	  legitimacy	  depends	  on	  the	  successful	  realization	  of	  those	  substantive	  objectives;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  its	  basis	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  functionalist	  rather	  than	  democratic.	  I	  will	  discuss	  each	  of	  these	  characteristics	  in	  turn.	  
	  
1. Functional	  specialization	  	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state,	  constitutionalism	  represents	  a	  comprehensive	  system	  of	  validation	  for	  public	  authority.	  Put	  differently,	  all	  exercises	  of	  state	  power	  must	  filter	  through	  the	  mesh	  of	  constitutional	  validity,	  or,	  as	  Grimm	  writes,	  that	  “[t]here	  is	  no	  space	  for	  proprietors	  of	  public	  power	  outside	  the	  constitution.”67	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  constitution	  the	  highest	  authority	  in	  a	  legal	  order,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  what	  Frank	  Michelman	  terms	  a	  “pervasive”	  quality.68	  Exertions	  of	  public	  power	  are	  valid	  insofar	  as	  they	  fall	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  constitution.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  comprehensive	  conception	  of	  constitutional	  authority,	  the	  decisions	  of	  EU	  institutions	  bind	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  only	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  powers	  explicitly	  conferred	  to	  the	  EU	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  Even	  though	  its	  boundaries	  remain	  fuzzy,	  the	  EU’s	  area	  of	  competence	  covers	  a	  functionally	  interrelated	  cluster	  of	  public	  policy	  objectives.	  Of	  the	  senses	  in	  which	  the	  term	  “functional	  constitutionalism”	  captures	  the	  distinctive	  characteristics	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
                                                67	  Dieter	  Grimm,	  “Treaty	  or	  constitution?	  The	  legal	  basis	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  after	  Maastricht,”	  in	  Erik	  Oddvar	  Eriksen,	  John	  Erik	  Fossum,	  and	  Agustín	  José	  Menéndez	  (eds),	  Developing	  a	  Constitution	  
for	  Europe	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2004),	  at	  72	  68	  Frank	  I.	  Michelman,	  “What	  do	  constitutions	  do	  that	  statutes	  don’t	  (legally	  speaking)?”,	  in	  Richard	  W.	  Bauman	  and	  Tzvi	  Kahana	  (eds),	  The	  Least	  Examined	  Branch:	  The	  Role	  of	  Legislatures	  in	  the	  
Constitutional	  State	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006)	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legal	  order,	  then,	  the	  first	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  scope	  of	  authority	  is	  functionally	  circumscribed	  rather	  than	  comprehensive.	  Since	  supranational	  law	  cannot	  lay	  claim	  to	  comprehensive	  validity	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  constitutional	  rule,	  its	  authority	  is	  coupled	  with	  an	  implicit	  recognition	  that	  other	  constitutional	  orders	  are	  responsible	  for	  other	  sectors	  of	  public	  authority.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  EU	  law	  claims	  supremacy	  over	  national	  law	  in	  the	  way	  that	  constitutional	  norms	  prevail	  over	  ordinary	  statute	  within	  domestic	  constitutional	  systems.	  Furthermore,	  the	  CJEU	  has	  interpreted	  the	  supremacy	  principle	  as	  an	  unconditional	  one,	  holding	  that	  even	  domestic	  constitutional	  norms	  must	  give	  way	  if	  they	  conflict	  with	  EU	  law.69	  “As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  European	  law,	  the	  four	  economic	  freedoms,	  and	  the	  injunctions	  against	  distortions	  of	  competition,	  have	  in	  fact	  gained	  constitutional	  force	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  member	  states.”70	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  supranational	  law	  has	  primacy	  over	  national	  laws	  only	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  validity	  delineated	  by	  the	  founding	  treaties,	  in	  other	  words,	  within	  a	  functionally	  delimited	  area	  of	  public	  policy.	  Even	  within	  that	  scope,	  moreover,	  EU	  law	  is	  subject	  to	  occasional	  pushback	  from	  domestic	  judiciaries,	  and	  relies	  on	  national	  courts	  for	  its	  application.71	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  only	  partially	  autonomous,	  since	  any	  significant	  expansion	  of	  its	  authority	  must	  be	  ratified	  by	  member	  states	  and	  can	  be	  reduced	  by	  them.72	  Furthermore,	  whereas	  domestic	  constitutional	  documents	  rarely	  contain	  provisions	  delimiting	  their	  normative	  authority,	  the	  treaties	  that	  ground	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  authority	  contain	  many	  expressions	  of	  this	  sort.73	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  functional	  constitutionalism	  also	  differs	  from	  a	  typical	  federal	  constitutional	  system.	  Like	  many	  federal	  systems,	  the	  EU	  operates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  principle	  of	  enumerated	  or	  conferred	  powers;	  that	  is,	  it	  can	  only	  act	  on	  matters	  explicitly	  entrusted	  to	  it.	  Furthermore,	  like	  many	  federal	  systems,	  the	  vertical	  allocation	  of	  competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  follows	  a	  functional	  pattern:	  some	  areas	  are	  exclusively	  entrusted	  to	  the	  EU;	  other	  policy	  decisions	  require	  coordination	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  member	  states;	  and	  a	  third	  category	  is	  reserved	  to	  states	  alone.	  Unlike	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  system,	  however,	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  federal	  constitution’s	  authority	  is	  typically	  of	  comprehensive,	  rather	  than	  functionally	  delimited,	  scope.	  Public	  institutions	  at	  all	  levels	  draw	  their	  authority	  
                                                
69 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective or Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
54; Case	  106/77,	  Amministrazione	  delle	  Finanze	  dello	  Stato	  v.	  Simmenthal	  SpA	  	  [1978]	  ECR	  629;	  Case	  C-­‐213/89,	  The	  Queen	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport,	  ex	  parte:	  Factortame	  Ltd	  and	  others	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐2433 
70 ibid, 58 
71 Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as It Gets?”, in J.H.H. 
Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 93 
72 Art 48 (2) TEU. 73	  Art	  1(1)	  of	  TFEU	  reads:	  “This	  Treaty	  organizes	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  determines…	  the	  delimitation	  of…	  its	  competences.”	  In	  addition,	  Article	  2(6)	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  “The	  scope	  of	  and	  arrangements	  for	  exercising	  the	  Union’s	  competences	  shall	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaties	  relating	  to	  each	  area,”	  meaning	  that	  each	  Treaty	  competence	  contains	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  limitation.	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from	  the	  constitution,	  even	  if	  the	  federal	  government	  itself	  is	  relatively	  weak	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  constituent	  units.	  In	  a	  typical	  federal	  system,	  then,	  the	  federal	  constitution	  is	  still	  the	  ultimate	  measure	  of	  legal	  validity.	  By	  contrast,	  functional	  constitutionalism	  is	  a	  system	  of	  limited	  material	  scope;	  it	  acknowledges	  that	  other	  legal	  systems	  take	  precedence	  in	  policy	  matters	  not	  allocated	  to	  it.	  In	  policy	  areas	  that	  exceed	  its	  functionally	  defined	  scope	  of	  authority,	  the	  functional	  constitution	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  supreme	  law.	  By	  acknowledging	  the	  limits	  of	  its	  own	  scope	  of	  application,	  yet	  operating	  as	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  constitutional	  system	  within	  that	  scope,	  the	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  order	  effectively	  detaches	  the	  constitutional	  form	  of	  political	  ordering	  from	  the	  attribute	  of	  sovereignty.	  Although	  one	  could	  construe	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  constitutional	  systems	  of	  its	  member	  states	  as	  one	  of	  sub-­‐	  and	  superordinate,	  derivative	  and	  original	  authority,	  it	  simply	  is	  not	  very	  instructive	  to	  do	  so.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  shoehorn	  these	  complex	  relationships	  into	  a	  neat	  hierarchy,	  it	  is	  more	  useful	  to	  trade	  in	  the	  monistic	  conception	  of	  constitutional	  authority	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  “pluralist	  [and	  dispersed]	  conception”	  in	  which	  “different	  persons	  or	  bodies	  having	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  in	  different	  circumstances,	  without	  there	  necessarily	  being	  any	  single,	  hierarchical	  system	  of	  decision-­‐making.”74	  Constitutional	  autonomy	  in	  Europe’s	  contemporary	  legal	  landscape	  is	  more	  helpfully	  conceived	  as	  graduated	  and	  intersectional	  rather	  than	  exclusive	  and	  comprehensive.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  picture	  I	  have	  painted	  here	  differs	  from	  the	  respective	  perceptions	  of	  both	  domestic	  constitutional	  courts	  and	  the	  EU	  judiciary	  of	  Europe’s	  legal	  landscape	  and	  their	  own	  position	  within	  it.	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  famously	  claims	  exclusive	  authority	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  bounds	  of	  supranational	  legal	  authority,	  and	  has	  held	  that	  “national	  courts	  have	  no	  jurisdiction	  themselves	  to	  declare	  that	  measures	  taken	  by	  Community	  institutions	  are	  invalid.”75	  Leading	  the	  counter-­‐charge	  on	  the	  part	  of	  national	  judiciaries,	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  reserves	  to	  itself	  the	  right	  to	  “[examine]	  whether	  legal	  instruments	  of	  the	  European	  institutions	  and	  bodies	  keep	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  sovereign	  powers	  accorded	  to	  them	  by	  way	  of	  conferral,”	  that	  is,	  to	  conduct	  ultra	  vires	  review	  of	  EU	  acts	  where	  the	  EU	  judiciary	  fails	  to	  do	  so.76	  In	  a	  pluralist	  constitutional	  landscape,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  questions	  of	  autonomy,	  supremacy,	  and	  decisional	  finality	  will	  garner	  competing,	  even	  incommensurable	  answers	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  each	  legal	  order.	  The	  perspective	  of	  the	  observer,	  however,	  need	  not	  overlap	  with	  that	  of	  any	  single	  participant.	  The	  task	  of	  constitutional	  theory	  is	  to	  comprehend	  the	  claims	  of	  constitutional	  primacy	  raised	  by	  member	  state	  courts	  and	  the	  EU	  judiciary	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  though	  without	  necessarily	  buying	  into	  any	  of	  them.	  	  
                                                74	  Richard	  Bellamy	  and	  Dario	  Castiglione,	  “Building	  the	  Union:	  The	  Nature	  of	  Sovereignty	  in	  the	  Political	  Architecture	  of	  Europe,”	  Law	  &	  Philosophy,	  vol.16	  (1997),	  no.4,	  at	  422	  
75 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199 
76 German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (German Lisbon Decision), 




In	  response	  to	  periodic	  challenges	  to	  the	  supremacy	  of	  supranational	  law	  by	  domestic	  constitutional	  courts,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  cultivated	  an	  instructive	  jurisprudence	  of	  what	  Weiler	  terms	  “constitutional	  toleration”	  or	  “constitutional	  conversation.”77	  Constitutional	  toleration	  is	  a	  discursive	  practice	  among	  the	  epistemic	  community	  of	  European	  jurists	  that	  enables	  a	  plurality	  of	  relatively	  autonomous	  orders	  to	  accommodate	  one	  another’s	  claims	  to	  validity.	  As	  Weiler	  writes,	  “the	  constitutional	  discourse	  in	  Europe	  must	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  conversation	  of	  many	  actors	  in	  a	  constitutional	  interpretive	  community	  rather	  than	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  with	  the	  ECJ	  at	  the	  top,”	  and	  in	  which	  “the	  jurisdictional	  line	  (lines)	  should	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  constitutional	  conversation,	  not	  a	  constitutional	  
diktat.”78	  This	  reciprocal	  practice	  engages	  domestic	  judiciaries	  in	  resolving	  questions	  about	  Europe’s	  complex	  constitutional	  architectonic,	  and	  illustrates	  the	  dialectic	  process	  by	  which	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  system	  has	  come	  to	  be	  been	  embedded	  within	  domestic	  constitutional	  orders,	  while	  prompting	  domestic	  constitutional	  orders	  to	  adapt	  to	  supranational	  obligations.	  A	  Manichean	  distinction	  between	  sovereign	  constitutional	  authority	  held	  by	  member	  states,	  and	  delegated	  authority	  held	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  capturing	  this	  dynamic	  process	  of	  reciprocal	  reconstitution.	  	  By	  contrast,	  functional	  constitutionalism	  is	  better	  adapted	  to	  describe	  a	  system	  that	  is	  “layered	  around	  already	  existing	  orders	  so	  that	  the	  result	  is	  an	  increasingly	  compound	  and	  accumulated	  executive	  order.”79	  The	  functional	  constitution	  is	  neither	  subordinate	  nor	  superordinate	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  local,	  regional,	  or	  national	  levels	  of	  law;	  rather,	  it	  carves	  out	  a	  composite	  slice	  of	  local,	  subnational,	  and	  national	  tiers	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  area.	  It	  is	  neither	  unambiguously	  subordinate	  nor	  superordinate	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  any	  of	  those	  levels	  taken	  individually.	  What	  I	  refer	  to	  throughout	  this	  book	  as	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is,	  fundamentally,	  a	  European	  legal	  order;	  one	  that	  encompasses	  not	  just	  a	  framework	  of	  supranational	  law	  but	  also	  national	  legal	  orders	  insofar	  as	  they	  intersect	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competence.	  This	  distinctive	  configuration	  is	  nicely	  encapsulated	  by	  John	  McCormick’s	  term	  “Sektoralstaat,”	  according	  to	  which	  “the	  EU	  is	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  and	  new	  form	  of	  polity”	  in	  comparison	  with	  either	  the	  law-­‐governed	  liberal	  state	  (Rechtsstaat)	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  or	  the	  corporatist	  welfare	  state	  (Sozialstaat)	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.80	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  Sektoralstaat	  denotes	  the	  simultaneous	  aggregation	  of	  levels	  of	  governance	  around	  a	  particular	  policy	  issue	  and	  the	  disaggregation	  of	  public	  power	  into	  “functionally	  limited	  enumerated	  powers.”81	  Constitutional	  mechanisms	  of	  entrenchment,	  supremacy,	  and	  direct	  effect	  help	  to	  insulate	  these	  enumerated	  powers	  against	  interference	  from	  national	  democratic	  control	  or	  constitutional	  scrutiny.	  As	  McCormick	  argues,	  supranational	  governance	  in	  Europe	  represents	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  sectorally	  concentrated	  form	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of	  authority	  that	  is	  administered	  through	  its	  own	  logics	  of	  coordination.	  In	  particular,	  whereas	  the	  Rechtstaat	  was	  animated	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  limited	  government,	  and	  the	  Sozialstaat	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  solidarity,	  the	  
Sektoralstaat	  has	  its	  own	  animating	  principles,	  namely	  those	  of	  expediency	  and	  epistemic	  competence.	  I	  discuss	  these	  principles	  in	  section	  (3)	  below.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  contribution	  of	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  legal	  system	  to	  our	  social	  scientific	  conception	  of	  constitutionalism,	  then,	  is	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  possibility	  (as	  distinct	  from	  the	  desirability)	  of	  constitutional	  pluralism	  in	  which	  distinct	  legal	  systems	  exercise	  complementary	  and	  occasionally	  conflictual	  forms	  of	  authority.	  	  Just	  as	  Diogenes	  the	  Cynic	  is	  fabled	  to	  have	  disproved	  Zeno’s	  dichotomy	  paradox	  by	  standing	  up	  and	  walking	  the	  distance	  that	  in	  theory	  should	  be	  impossible	  to	  cross,	  the	  EU	  bears	  out	  what	  a	  sovereigntist	  conception	  of	  constitutionalism	  dismisses	  as	  impossible,	  namely,	  a	  pluralist	  system	  of	  constitutional	  authority	  in	  which	  “[d]istinct	  systems	  can	  co-­‐exist	  without	  any	  one	  having	  to	  deny	  either	  the	  independence	  or	  the	  normative	  character	  of	  another.”82	  	  	  	  	  
2. Teleological	  rigidity	  	   	  Constitutional	  theorists	  often	  distinguish	  constitutional	  norms	  from	  ordinary	  legislation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  spectral	  characteristics:	  first,	  relative	  to	  ordinary	  legislation,	  constitutional	  norms	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  onerous	  to	  modify.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Holmes	  and	  Sunstein	  argue	  that	  “[c]onstitutionalism	  hinges	  upon	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  procedures	  governing	  ordinary	  legislation	  and	  the	  more	  onerous	  procedural	  hurdles	  that	  must	  be	  overcome	  in	  order	  to	  recast	  the	  ground	  rules	  of	  political	  life.”83	  In	  particular,	  the	  constitution’s	  function	  as	  the	  normative	  frame	  for	  politics	  implies	  that,	  all	  things	  equal,	  it	  should	  be	  resistant	  to	  abrupt	  alteration	  and	  partisan	  manipulation	  for	  short-­‐term	  political	  gain.	  As	  Elster	  writes,	  constitutionalism	  “ensures	  that	  constitutional	  change	  will	  be	  slow,	  compared	  to	  the	  fast	  lane	  of	  ordinary	  politics.”84	  	  Secondly,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  their	  relatively	  fixed	  status,	  constitutional	  norms	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  substantively	  more	  open-­‐ended	  in	  comparison	  to	  ordinary	  legislation.	  If	  constitutional	  rules	  are	  onerous	  to	  change,	  they	  should	  be	  broad	  enough	  to	  accommodate	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  political	  agendas	  and	  supple	  enough	  to	  countenance	  changing	  social	  circumstances.	  In	  differentiating	  constitutional	  rules	  from	  ordinary	  political	  rules,	  public	  choice	  theorists	  in	  particular	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  the	  former’s	  relative	  indeterminacy	  towards	  alternate	  policy	  choices.	  The	  metaphor	  of	  a	  sporting	  competition	  is	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  difference:	  constitutional	  design	  is	  analogous	  to	  “agreements	  on	  the	  rules	  of	  a	  game”	  whereas	  the	  ordinary	  policy	  process	  seeks	  “agreements	  on	  the	  outcomes.”85	  Put	  differently,	  “[a]t	  the	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constitutional	  stage,	  one	  chooses	  the	  institutions	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  make	  all	  future	  political	  choices.”86	  Similarly,	  James	  Buchanan	  writes	  that	  “the	  hallmark	  of	  the	  constitutionalist	  is	  the	  categorical	  distinction	  he	  makes	  between	  outcomes	  generated	  within	  defined	  rules	  and	  the	  rules	  themselves.”87	  	  Taking	  this	  argument	  one	  step	  further,	  Dennis	  Mueller	  argues	  that	  the	  process	  of	  constitutional	  framing	  is	  likely	  to	  promote	  relatively	  neutral	  structural	  choices	  that	  allow	  for	  as	  many	  possible	  policy	  outcomes	  as	  possible.	  Provided	  they	  represent	  sufficiently	  diverse	  interests,	  Mueller	  hypothesizes	  that	  constitutional	  framers	  will	  look	  for	  rules	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  favor	  certain	  future	  substantive	  outcomes	  over	  others.88	  Since	  framers	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  agree	  on,	  much	  less	  foresee,	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  substantive	  policy	  controversies	  that	  will	  arise	  in	  the	  future,	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  converge	  on	  rules	  that	  either	  reflect	  shared	  substantive	  values	  or	  set	  out	  procedures	  that	  are	  impartial	  (as	  far	  as	  possible)	  regarding	  future	  outcomes.	  	  Mueller’s	  assumption	  on	  this	  score	  seems	  overly	  sanguine.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  guarantee	  either	  the	  fairness	  or	  the	  impartiality	  of	  constitutional	  choice:	  at	  worst,	  the	  constitution-­‐makers	  may	  be	  a	  privileged	  cabal	  looking	  to	  oppress	  and	  exploit	  the	  majority.	  Even	  if	  they	  are	  not,	  constitutions	  are	  invariably	  shaped	  by	  contingent	  bargains,	  existing	  power	  imbalances,	  and	  past	  injustices.	  Framers	  might	  converge	  on	  rules	  that	  help	  them	  entrench	  their	  existing	  advantages	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  excluded	  groups.	  As	  Ran	  Hirschl	  argues,	  constitutional	  entrenchment	  can	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  “hegemonic	  preservation”	  rather	  than	  for	  protecting	  universalizable	  interests.89	  Constitutional	  norms	  can	  immunize	  the	  preferred	  policies	  of	  elites	  against	  future	  majoritarian	  challenge.	  In	  similar	  vein,	  Melissa	  Schwartzberg	  argues	  that	  as	  a	  historical	  fact,	  the	  strategy	  of	  making	  certain	  norms	  immutable	  has	  “a	  rich	  legacy	  of	  protecting	  narrow,	  instrumental	  decrees,	  such	  as	  treaties,	  and	  unjust	  laws	  against	  religious	  toleration	  and,	  most	  notoriously,	  slavery.”90	  A	  constitutional	  norm,	  just	  like	  any	  other	  legal	  norm,	  can	  be	  unjust,	  oppressive,	  or	  illiberal;	  but	  in	  contrast	  to	  an	  ordinary	  legal	  norm,	  it	  is	  that	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  change.	  Where	  constitutional	  rules	  diminish	  the	  ability	  of	  citizens	  to	  contest	  acts	  of	  domination,	  they	  deny	  rather	  than	  fulfill	  those	  promises	  that	  vindicate	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  constitutional	  rule.	  	  Although	  it	  throws	  into	  doubt	  the	  tenability	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  constitutional	  choice	  and	  everyday	  political	  choice,	  however,	  this	  line	  of	  critique	  nevertheless	  speaks	  in	  favor	  of	  reinforcing	  it	  in	  practice.	  Assuming,	  as	  Charles	  Beard	  contended	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  US	  Constitution,	  that	  the	  framers	  of	  a	  constitutional	  document	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  strong	  interests	  in	  designing	  the	  constitution	  so	  as	  to	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favor	  their	  own	  interests,91	  constitutional	  norms	  should	  either	  be	  sufficiently	  mutable	  to	  allow	  the	  marginalized	  to	  seek	  revision	  in	  the	  future,	  or	  substantively	  open-­‐ended	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  such	  contestation	  to	  take	  place	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  ordinary	  political	  process	  (or	  both).	  Put	  differently,	  since	  entrenched	  norms	  are	  a	  potential	  hegemonic	  device,	  it	  is	  all	  the	  more	  important	  to	  insist	  that	  constitutional	  norms	  be	  substantively	  underdetermined	  in	  the	  sense	  widening	  the	  spectrum	  of	  policy	  choices	  available	  to	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  process.	  As	  Richard	  Bellamy	  argues,	  “rather	  than	  a	  resource	  of	  the	  fundamental	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  organize	  a	  democratic	  society,	  the	  constitution	  represents	  a	  fundamental	  structure	  for	  reaching	  collective	  decisions	  about	  social	  arrangements	  in	  a	  democratic	  way.”92	  Constitutional	  norms	  and	  practices	  that	  define	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  must	  stop	  short	  of	  entrenching	  the	  mandated	  outcomes	  of	  those	  processes.	  The	  very	  compatibility	  of	  constitutionalism	  with	  ideals	  of	  individual	  liberty	  and	  participatory	  government	  hinges	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  analytical	  distinction	  between	  the	  rules	  and	  outcomes	  of	  the	  political	  process,	  and	  the	  constitution’s	  ability	  to	  maintain	  that	  distinction	  in	  practice.	  While	  no	  constitutional	  regime	  is	  indifferent	  with	  regard	  to	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  purest	  proceduralism	  is	  not	  free	  from	  substantive	  presuppositions,	  EU	  law	  largely	  collapses	  the	  very	  distinction	  between	  defining	  the	  rules	  of	  a	  game	  and	  stipulating	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  game.93	  The	  second	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “functional,”	  then,	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  use	  of	  constitutional	  mechanisms	  as	  “an	  
instrument	  for	  action”	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  “framework	  of	  political	  action.”94	  Rather	  than	  laying	  down	  basic	  rules	  to	  govern	  the	  future	  selection	  of	  policy	  ends,	  EU	  law	  determines	  those	  ends	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  detail	  that	  would	  typically	  be	  left	  up	  to	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  or	  administrative	  process.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  because	  EU	  law	  exists	  to	  hold	  states	  to	  their	  long-­‐term	  policy	  commitments,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  detailed	  in	  mandating	  particular	  outcomes	  compared	  to	  most	  constitutional	  norms.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  both	  treaty	  provisions	  and	  ordinary	  EU	  measures	  are	  difficult	  to	  revise	  or	  repeal,	  requiring	  agreement	  among	  member	  states	  and,	  in	  some	  instances,	  ratification	  in	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  requirements.	  In	  curtailing	  the	  policy	  options	  available	  to	  domestic	  majorities,	  EU	  law	  does	  not	  only	  entrench	  the	  external	  obligations	  of	  member	  states,	  but	  reorders	  their	  internal	  priorities.	  Joerges	  notes,	  “the	  institutionalising	  of	  a	  European	  market	  order	  does	  not	  simply	  bear	  upon	  states’	  capacity	  for	  political	  action,	  but	  ultimately	  also	  on	  the	  states’	  own	  constitutional	  identities.”	  95	  
                                                
91 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1921 [1913]). 92	  Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),	  4	  
93 For a critique of proceduralist constitutional theory (in particular, that of John Hart Ely) on these 
grounds, see Lawrence H. Tribe, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories”, 
Yale Law Journal, vol.89 (1980), pp.1063-80 94	  The	  distinction	  is	  Jon	  Elster’s.	  He	  argues	  that	  a	  constitution	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  latter	  rather	  than	  the	  former.	  See	  Elster,	  Ulysses	  Unbound,	  100,	  emphasis	  added.	  
95 Christian Joerges, “Taking the law seriously: On political science and the role of law in the process of 
European integration,” European Law Journal, Vol.2 (1996), No.2, pp. 105-135, 109 
 26 
Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  procedural	  rigidity	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  coupled	  with	  teleological	  rigidity;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  not	  only	  are	  the	  various	  procedures	  for	  amending	  EU	  law	  onerous,	  but	  they	  also	  impose	  elaborate	  substantive	  obligations	  on	  member	  states.	  Whereas	  constitutions	  traditionally	  justify	  entrenched	  rules	  for	  their	  role	  in	  institutionalizing	  democratic	  revision	  and	  contestation,	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  has	  been	  configured	  to	  diminish	  the	  ability	  of	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  to	  revise	  their	  policy	  commitments.96	  As	  Stefano	  Bartolini	  notes,	  “the	  constitutionalization	  of	  the	  treaties	  has	  ‘frozen’	  certain	  specific	  goals	  by	  shielding	  them	  from	  political	  redefinition.”97To	  be	  sure,	  the	  treaty	  objectives	  are	  negotiated	  by	  electorally	  accountable	  member	  state	  governments	  and	  approved	  by	  national	  parliaments	  or	  subjected	  to	  popular	  referenda.	  Even	  if	  treaty	  objectives	  are	  ultimately	  traceable	  to	  the	  will	  of	  national	  publics,	  however,	  the	  entrenched	  status	  of	  the	  treaties	  makes	  downstream	  contestation	  and	  revision	  difficult.	  Supranational	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Commission,	  the	  Court,	  or	  even	  the	  European	  Parliament	  tend	  to	  work	  within	  the	  existing	  teleological	  parameters	  of	  the	  treaties.	  Unlike	  domestic	  political	  institutions,	  these	  bodies	  are	  purposive	  in	  their	  configuration:	  they	  can	  push	  the	  integration	  project	  forward,	  but	  not	  backward;	  they	  can	  expand	  it,	  but	  can	  do	  little	  to	  constrain	  it.	  This	  combination	  tends	  to	  create	  a	  one-­‐way	  ratchet	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  objectives	  enshrined	  in	  the	  treaties,	  while	  narrowing	  the	  options	  available	  to	  democratically	  elected	  legislatures	  particularly	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  In	  sum,	  EU	  law	  is	  substantively	  elaborate	  in	  the	  way	  of	  ordinary	  legislation,	  but	  entrenched	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  constitutional	  law,	  creating	  an	  unusually	  rigid	  framework	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  	  	  
3. Functionalist	  basis	  of	  legitimation	  	  	   The	  most	  distinctive	  aspect	  of	  the	  European	  Union’s	  constitutional	  system	  is	  its	  functionalist	  pattern	  of	  legitimation,	  a	  theme	  I	  have	  already	  discussed	  in	  outline.	  To	  recall,	  democratic	  theories	  of	  constitutional	  rule	  justify	  the	  authority	  of	  entrenched	  constitutional	  norms	  with	  reference	  to	  their	  role	  in	  enabling	  the	  exercise	  of	  popular	  self-­‐rule.	  Likewise,	  under	  a	  liberal	  conception,	  constitutional	  guarantees	  deserve	  allegiance	  because	  they	  safeguard	  the	  sacrosanct	  liberties	  of	  individuals.	  Despite	  having	  many	  of	  the	  features	  of	  a	  constitutional	  system,	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  aim	  of	  European	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  been	  to	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  but	  disagree	  over	  how	  it	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  Contradictions	  of	  Supranationalism:	  Administrative	  Governance	  and	  Constitutionalization	  in	  European	  Integration	  since	  the	  1950s,”	  Loyola	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  Law	  
Review,	  vol.	  37	  (2003),	  no.	  2,	  pp.363-­‐406	  97	  Stefano	  Bartolini,	  Restructuring	  Europe.	  Center	  Formation,	  System	  Building,	  and	  Political	  Structuring	  
between	  the	  Nation-­‐State	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  165	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however,	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  over	  member	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  is	  not	  justified	  primarily	  with	  reference	  to	  either	  of	  these	  principles.	  It	  is	  far	  more	  commonly	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  allows	  public	  power	  to	  be	  exercised	  more	  effectively.	  Member	  states	  have	  delegated	  power	  to	  supranational	  institutions	  to	  reap	  the	  efficiency	  gains	  of	  an	  integrated	  and	  competitive	  market,	  respond	  to	  the	  pressures	  of	  global	  interdependence,	  protect	  the	  environment,	  consumers,	  and	  labor	  standards.	  The	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  backs	  up	  the	  extraordinary	  authority	  of	  constitutional	  law	  with	  a	  technocratic	  pattern	  of	  justification	  according	  to	  which	  policy	  questions	  are	  understood	  as	  problems	  to	  be	  solved	  rather	  than	  compromises	  to	  be	  struck.	  This	  pattern	  surfaces	  in	  deliberate	  attempts	  to	  obscure	  the	  political	  stakes	  of	  EU	  decisions	  by	  dressing	  them	  up	  as	  bureaucratic	  governance.	  Emblematically,	  the	  EU’s	  legislative	  output	  is	  designated	  with	  the	  technocratic-­‐sounding	  terminology	  of	  regulations,	  directives,	  and	  decisions	  rather	  than	  as	  laws	  or	  
statutes	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  EU	  issues	  legislation	  and	  governs	  citizens	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  an	  ordinary,	  coercive	  political	  community.98	  	  In	  the	  parlance	  of	  EU	  scholars,	  the	  EU’s	  technocratic	  pattern	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  known,	  following	  Fritz	  Scharpf’s	  coinage,	  as	  “output	  legitimacy.”	  Accordingly,	  “political	  choices	  are	  legitimate	  if	  and	  because	  they	  effectively	  promote	  the	  common	  welfare	  of	  the	  constituency	  in	  question.”99	  By	  contrast,	  under	  an	  input-­‐oriented	  conception	  of	  legitimacy,	  “[p]olitical	  choices	  are	  legitimate	  if	  and	  because	  they	  reflect	  the	  ‘will	  of	  the	  people’—that	  is,	  if	  they	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  authentic	  preferences	  of	  the	  members	  of	  a	  community.”100	  Modern	  constitutional	  systems	  that	  institutionalize	  democratic	  control	  and	  oversight	  of	  legislative	  and	  executive	  powers	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  input	  legitimacy,	  that	  is,	  the	  idea	  public	  power	  is	  legitimate	  because	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  will	  of	  those	  who	  are	  governed	  by	  it.	  What	  transforms	  the	  brute	  power	  of	  the	  state	  into	  normatively	  validated	  exercises	  of	  authority	  are	  the	  guarantees	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  autonomy,	  equal	  participation,	  and	  due	  consideration	  built	  into	  democratic	  procedures.101	  	  According	  to	  Scharpf,	  input-­‐	  and	  output-­‐oriented	  modes	  of	  legitimation	  constitute	  “two	  dimensions	  of	  democratic	  self-­‐determination.”102	  Scharpf	  invokes	  Lincoln’s	  understanding	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  claim	  to	  govern	  “for	  the	  people”	  to	  denote	  output	  legitimacy,	  while	  government	  “of	  and	  by	  the	  people”	  stands	  in	  for	  the	  input	  dimension.103	  Scharpf	  argues	  that	  “plausible	  legitimacy	  arguments	  cannot	  be	  
                                                
98 When	  member	  states	  formally	  abandoned	  the	  effort	  to	  adopt	  the	  Constitutional	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  and	  commissioned	  an	  intergovernmental	  conference	  (IGC)	  to	  cobble	  together	  its	  operational	  provisions	  into	  an	  ordinary	  amending	  treaty,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  items	  on	  the	  IGC’s	  to-­‐do	  list	  was	  that	  “the	  denominations	  ‘law’	  and	  ‘framework	  law’…	  be	  abandoned,	  the	  existing	  denominations	  ‘regulations,’	  ‘directives’	  and	  ‘decisions’…	  retained.”	  Brussels European Council of 21-22 June 2007, Presidency 
Conclusions. 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex I, I.1, p.16 
99 Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective or Democratic? 6 
100 ibid, 6 101	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  Between	  Facts	  and	  Norms	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  1996);	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  “On	  the	  Internal	  Relation	  between	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Democracy.”	  	  
102 Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective or Democratic? 2 103	  Scharpf,	  Governing	  in	  Europe,	  358;	  Fritz	  W.	  Scharpf,	  “Democratic	  legitimacy	  under	  conditions	  of	  regulatory	  competition:	  Why	  Europe	  differs	  from	  the	  United	  States,”	  in	  Kalypso	  Nicolaïdis	  and	  Robert	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based	  on	  purely	  input-­‐oriented	  (or	  ‘populist’—Riker	  1982)	  notions	  of	  democracy,”	  but	  must	  include	  considerations	  of	  how	  well	  state	  institutions	  serve	  the	  public	  interest.104	  Like	  Scharpf,	  Giandomenico	  Majone	  opposes	  “populist”	  or	  “majoritarian”	  understandings	  of	  democracy	  to	  a	  “Madisonian”	  conception	  that	  aims	  to	  “share,	  disperse,	  delegate	  and	  limit	  power”	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  interest	  from	  majoritarian	  excess.105	  Under	  this	  conception,	  non-­‐majoritarian	  institutions	  such	  as	  judicial	  review,	  independent	  central	  banks,	  and	  expert	  administrative	  agencies	  are	  no	  less	  democratic	  than	  elected	  legislatures.	  	  	  While	  Scharpf	  is	  correct	  to	  observe	  that	  participatory	  institutions	  do	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  regime	  if	  they	  consistently	  fail	  to	  deliver	  policies	  that	  benefit	  citizens,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  output-­‐oriented	  criterion	  is	  properly	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  democratic	  legitimation.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  not	  all	  forms	  of	  political	  legitimation	  are	  democratic:	  political	  regimes	  have	  appealed	  to	  sources	  as	  diverse	  as	  divine	  right	  and	  ordainment,	  antiquity,	  custom,	  individual	  liberty,	  and	  class	  interests	  to	  justify	  their	  rule.	  Furthermore,	  output	  legitimacy	  is	  a	  criterion	  that	  not	  only	  democracies	  but	  all	  other	  types	  of	  government	  must	  meet	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  stability	  and	  longevity.	  While	  it	  is	  attractive	  to	  think	  of	  effective	  government	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  democratic	  rule	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  criterion	  external	  to	  it,	  doing	  so	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  defining	  democracy	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  actively	  hostile	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  participatory	  government.	  Institutions	  designed	  to	  keep	  electoral	  or	  majoritarian	  influence	  at	  bay	  can	  be	  understood	  primarily	  as	  instantiating	  a	  form	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  “refusing	  the	  very	  definition”	  of	  democracy.106	  This	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	  administrative	  institutions	  are	  as	  such	  incompatible	  with	  democracy	  or	  to	  question	  that	  epistemic	  considerations	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  it;	  it	  is	  rather	  to	  observe	  that	  output	  is	  not	  a	  democratic	  criterion	  
per	  se.	  This	  observation	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  institutions	  designed	  to	  ensure	  effective	  government	  do	  not	  necessarily	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy;	  in	  fact,	  their	  empowerment	  often	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  participatory	  decision-­‐making.	  Conversely,	  participatory	  and	  representative	  institutions	  do	  not	  always	  govern	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  or	  make	  effective	  policy	  decisions.	  The	  claim	  that	  democracy	  on	  balance	  offers	  the	  best	  procedural	  device	  for	  generating	  good	  policy	  outcomes	  conflates	  two	  expectations	  that	  are	  distinct	  and,	  often,	  discrepant.	  Rather	  than	  being	  shoehorned	  into	  the	  category	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  considerations	  about	  whether	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  is	  better	  or	  worse	  at	  delivering	  public	  goods	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  standards	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  standards	  I	  consider	  under	  the	  term	  functionalist	  legitimation.	  Democracy	  is	  a	  contested	  and	  supple	  concept	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  associating	  it	  with	  muscular	  epistocratic	  criteria	  has	  what	  Nadia	  Urbinati	  calls	  a	  “disfiguring”	  effect	  on	  this	  important	  normative	  concept.107	  	  
                                                                                                                                            Howse	  (eds),	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  (Oxford:	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  University	  Press,	  2001),	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  at	  270	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  “From	  the	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  to	  the	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While	  Scharpf	  maintains	  that	  the	  input-­‐	  and	  output-­‐oriented	  dimensions	  of	  legitimacy	  are	  “generally	  complementary,”	  the	  EU’s	  long-­‐running	  crisis	  of	  legitimation	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  precarious	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  two.	  Supranational	  institutions	  rely	  on	  their	  greater	  problem-­‐solving	  capacity	  to	  make	  up	  for	  removing	  decision-­‐making	  power	  from	  elected	  institutions	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Put	  differently,	  the	  EU	  strives	  to	  deliver	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  all	  citizens	  can	  reasonably	  be	  assumed	  to	  prefer,	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  offer	  citizens	  many	  meaningful	  opportunities	  for	  choosing	  between	  policy	  platforms.	  Acknowledging	  the	  fundamentally	  non-­‐democratic	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  anti-­‐democratic)	  nature	  of	  the	  claim	  to	  effective	  government	  or	  “legitimation	  by	  results”	  is	  the	  necessary	  step	  for	  grasping	  the	  EU’s	  distinctiveness	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  ordering	  and	  critically	  evaluating	  its	  flaws.	  	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  evaluate	  in	  greater	  detail	  why	  the	  EU’s	  mechanisms	  of	  democratic	  accountability	  and	  representation	  do	  not	  significantly	  alter	  its	  functionalist	  basis	  of	  legitimacy.	  Taken	  together,	  I	  will	  argue,	  the	  avenues	  of	  democratic	  participation,	  control,	  and	  oversight	  available	  for	  citizens	  wishing	  to	  register	  their	  preferences	  in	  supranational	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  still	  take	  second	  place	  to	  the	  EU’s	  reliance	  on	  output	  legitimacy.	  For	  now,	  notice	  that	  there	  is	  a	  systemic	  reason	  why	  the	  EU	  can	  at	  best	  only	  partially	  realize	  the	  lofty	  commitments	  to	  democratic	  self-­‐rule	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  as	  amended	  in	  2009.108	  As	  a	  commitment	  device	  for	  sovereign	  states,	  the	  guiding	  objective	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  to	  insulate	  substantive	  policy	  decisions	  from	  democratic	  control.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  functional	  constitutionalism	  is	  designed	  to	  disable	  democratic	  self-­‐rule	  far	  exceeds	  any	  “counter-­‐majoritarian	  difficulty”109	  associated	  with	  constitutional	  constraints	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  Like	  domestic	  constitutional	  constraint,	  supranational	  law	  is	  meant	  to	  hold	  majorities	  at	  bay;	  unlike	  a	  conventional	  constitution,	  however,	  it	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  name	  of	  facilitating	  the	  democratic	  process	  itself.	  The	  EU’s	  authority	  is	  configured	  to	  secure	  “superordinate	  goods”	  such	  as	  economic	  productivity,	  employment,	  health	  and	  safety,	  consumer	  gains,	  or	  environmental	  protection,	  casting	  democratic	  participation	  as	  a	  “subordinate	  good”	  that	  should	  be	  met	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  superordinate	  goods.110	  Nowhere	  is	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  functionalist	  logic	  more	  visible	  than	  in	  the	  treaty	  provisions	  that	  define	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  EU’s	  scope	  of	  competence.	  Although	  
                                                
108 The	  2009	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  has	  amended	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  to	  include	  new	  “provisions	  on	  democratic	  principles,”	  which	  affirm	  “the	  right	  [of	  every	  citizen]	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  democratic	  life	  of	  the	  Union,”	  emphasize	  that	  “citizens	  are	  directly	  represented	  at	  Union	  level	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament,”	  and	  recognize	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  as	  “expressing	  the	  will	  of	  citizens	  of	  the	  Union.”	  Title	  II	  confers	  duties	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Union	  institutions	  to	  “give	  citizens	  and	  representative	  associations	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  known	  and	  publicly	  exchange	  their	  views	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  Union	  action”	  and	  to	  maintain	  “dialogue	  with	  representative	  associations	  and	  civil	  society.”	  Art.s	  10-­‐11	  TEU 109	  Bickel	  coined	  this	  felicitous	  phrase	  to	  refer	  specifically	  to	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  judicial	  review.	  I	  use	  it	  more	  broadly	  to	  characterize	  the	  apparent	  constraints	  constitutional	  norms	  place	  on	  popular	  will.	  Alexander	  Bickel,	  The	  Least	  Dangerous	  Branch?	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  at	  the	  Bar	  of	  Politics	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1986)	  
110 The distinction between subordinate and superordinate goods draws on Ian	  Shapiro,	  Democratic	  Justice	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  23. 
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the	  EU’s	  authority	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  powers	  member	  states	  have	  explicitly	  conferred	  to	  it,	  its	  outer	  bounds	  are	  contested,	  as	  in	  any	  regular	  federal	  system.	  The	  treaties	  enshrine	  the	  principles	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  proportionality	  as	  guides	  for	  resolving	  questions	  of	  competence.	  According	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity,	  	  in	  areas	  which	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  its	  exclusive	  competence,	  the	  Union	  shall	  act	  only	  if	  and	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  proposed	  action	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  achieved	  by	  the	  Member	  States,	  either	  at	  central	  level	  or	  at	  regional	  and	  local	  level,	  but	  can	  rather,	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  scale	  or	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  action,	  be	  better	  achieved	  at	  Union	  level.111	  Phrased	  more	  simply,	  on	  matters	  where	  the	  treaties	  do	  not	  establish	  a	  European	  competence	  to	  act,	  the	  Union	  is	  allowed	  to	  claim	  authority	  only	  if	  member	  states	  cannot	  effectively	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  objective	  acting	  alone.	  The	  subsidiarity	  principle	  does	  not	  say,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  should	  act	  only	  where	  its	  actions	  would	  be	  more	  democratically	  legitimate,	  or	  more	  conducive	  to	  individual	  autonomy,	  in	  comparison	  to	  member	  states	  acting	  singly.	  Rather,	  the	  criterion	  guiding	  any	  proposed	  extension	  of	  EU	  competence	  is	  its	  conduciveness	  to	  the	  effective	  exercise	  of	  power	  rather	  than	  some	  alternative	  principle	  such	  as	  popular	  participation,	  cultural	  specificity,	  distributive	  justice,	  or	  affected	  interests.	  	  The	  functionalist	  phrasing	  of	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle	  also	  undermines	  the	  view	  that	  supranational	  governance	  is	  about	  carrying	  the	  democratic	  principle	  of	  affected	  interests	  beyond	  the	  state.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  supranational	  institutions	  provide	  a	  forum	  that	  compels	  states	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  effects	  their	  decisions	  have	  on	  non-­‐citizens,	  and	  as	  such,	  expands	  the	  scope	  of	  democratic	  participation.	  112	  This	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle,	  which	  presumes	  that	  decisions	  taken	  at	  the	  national	  or	  sub-­‐national	  levels	  are	  by	  default	  more	  democratically	  legitimate,	  but	  that	  reasons	  of	  effective	  government	  may	  outweigh	  the	  presumption	  of	  proximity	  to	  the	  citizens.	  In	  other	  words,	  far	  from	  awarding	  competences	  to	  the	  EU	  based	  on	  the	  democratic	  value-­‐added	  of	  supranational	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  treaties	  tacitly	  admit	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  legitimation	  based	  on	  efficiency	  and	  democracy.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	  which	  immediately	  follows	  the	  subsidiarity	  clause,	  provides	  that	  “the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  Union	  action	  shall	  not	  exceed	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties.”113	  Here,	  too,	  the	  criterion	  by	  which	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  is	  established	  and	  circumscribed	  is	  one	  of	  effective	  government	  rather	  than	  any	  other	  available	  standard	  such	  as	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  same	  clause	  might	  read:	  “the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  Union	  action	  shall	  not	  exceed	  what	  the	  demos	  /	  demoi	  authorize(s)	  it	  to	  do.”	  Or,	  a	  rights-­‐based	  version	  of	  the	  same	  principle	  would	  commission	  the	  EU	  with	  authority	  required	  to	  do	  “what	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights.”	  
                                                
111 Art 5(3) TEU, emphasis added 
112	  For	  instance,	  Maduro	  argues	  that	  European	  integration	  helps	  to	  “[correct]	  the	  constitutional	  limits	  of	  
national	  political	  communities.”	  Miguel	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  “Sovereignty	  in	  Europe:	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  a	  European	  Political	  Community,”	  in	  Mary	  L.	  Volcansek	  and	  John	  F.	  Stack,	  Jr.	  
(eds),	  Courts	  Crossing	  Borders:	  Blurring	  the	  Lines	  of	  Sovereignty	  (Durham,	  NC:	  Carolina	  Academic	  Press,	  
2005).	  
113 Art 5(4) TEU, emphasis added 
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As	  these	  hypothetical	  alternative	  formulations	  illustrate,	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  claim	  to	  effective	  government,	  which	  simultaneously	  commissions	  and	  delimits	  it.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  principles	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  proportionality	  imply	  that	  the	  Union	  can	  arrogate	  as	  much	  power	  as	  the	  treaty	  objectives	  warrant,	  and	  that	  any	  attenuation	  of	  democratic	  control	  that	  results	  from	  such	  arrogation	  of	  power	  is	  compensated	  by	  the	  gains	  in	  effective	  decision-­‐making.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  however,	  EU	  institutions	  lack	  the	  authority	  to	  revise,	  question,	  or	  curtail	  the	  objectives	  enshrined	  in	  the	  treaties,	  however	  intense	  democratically	  expressed	  popular	  preferences	  may	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  just	  that.	  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  effectiveness	  that	  guides	  the	  scope	  and	  nature	  of	  supranational	  power	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  European	  Union.	  Power-­‐building,	  as	  Alfred	  Stepan	  points	  out,	  is	  an	  essential	  objective	  of	  “coming-­‐together	  federations,”	  “whereby	  previously	  sovereign	  polities	  agree	  to	  give	  up	  part	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  in	  order	  to	  pool	  their	  resources	  to	  increase	  their	  collective	  security	  and	  to	  achieve	  other	  goals,	  including	  economic	  ones.”114	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  far	  from	  being	  unique	  to	  the	  EU,	  this	  logic	  was	  prominent	  in	  the	  constitutional	  founding	  of	  the	  US.	  As	  the	  Federalist	  Papers	  repeatedly	  noted,	  the	  US	  Constitution	  was	  intended,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  endow	  a	  federal	  government	  with	  the	  power	  to	  provide	  for	  internal	  and	  external	  security,	  promote	  commerce,	  and	  oversee	  territorial	  expansion	  than	  the	  several	  states	  acting	  alone	  or	  in	  a	  looser	  form	  of	  alliance.	  And	  as	  Spinelli	  presciently	  observed	  in	  1956,	  “when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  supranational	  unification	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  political	  life,”	  as	  Europeans	  were	  at	  the	  time	  attempting	  to	  do,	  “one	  cannot	  fail	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  American	  model,	  because	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  American	  system	  is	  the	  very	  logic	  of	  political	  power	  building.”115	  What	  makes	  the	  European	  Union	  distinctive,	  however,	  is	  the	  particular	  weight	  it	  assigns	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  power-­‐building	  compared	  to	  the	  alternative	  logics	  of	  democratic	  and	  rights-­‐based	  legitimacy.	  Its	  institutional	  structure,	  scope	  of	  action,	  and	  legal	  order	  rely	  overwhelmingly	  on	  the	  claim	  to	  effective	  governance,	  at	  times	  even	  acknowledging	  (as	  the	  subsidiarity	  and	  proportionality	  principles	  implicitly	  do)	  that	  such	  gains	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  democratic	  control.	  	  	  
(iii) Epistocracy	  and	  its	  discontents	  	   	  To	  argue	  as	  I	  have	  done	  here	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  EU’s	  supranational	  legal	  order	  is	  premised	  on	  a	  claim	  to	  functional	  effectiveness	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  EU	  actually	  fulfills	  that	  promise,	  just	  as	  absolutist	  monarchies	  could	  appeal	  to	  divine	  sanction	  to	  justify	  their	  authority	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  celestial	  annunciation	  to	  that	  effect.	  What	  I	  advance	  is	  a	  contestable	  claim	  about	  the	  justificatory	  narrative	  that	  
                                                
114 Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model,” Journal of Democracy, vol.10 
(1999), no.4, pp. 19-34, 21 
115 Altiero Spinelli, “The American Constitutional Model and Attempts at European Unification,” The 
Federalist, vol.47 (2005), no.2, pp.115-125. Available at: 
http://www.thefederalist.eu/site/files/PDF/EN/2000/2005-2-EN.pdf 
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shapes	  the	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  dominant	  register	  in	  which	  its	  discursive	  appeal	  for	  the	  allegiance	  of	  member	  states	  and	  citizens	  takes	  place.	  Put	  differently,	  I	  treat	  the	  commitment	  to	  effective	  government	  as	  an	  “aspiration	  and	  not	  fact.”116	  To	  be	  sure,	  if	  the	  EU	  consistently	  fails	  to	  fulfill	  its	  promise	  to	  deliver	  better	  policy	  results	  than	  member	  states	  acting	  alone,	  then	  it	  will	  need	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  a	  meaningful	  discourse	  of	  legitimation.	  Indeed,	  the	  EU’s	  inability	  to	  swiftly	  resolve	  the	  euro	  crisis	  has	  done	  much	  damage	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  its	  claim	  that	  it	  can	  govern	  monetary	  policy	  more	  adroitly	  than	  member	  states.	  In	  sum,	  describing	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  system	  of	  functional	  constitutionalism	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  supranational	  institutions	  are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  more	  effective	  than	  member	  states	  in	  achieving	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	  them.	  Rather,	  it	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  Europe’s	  supranational	  constitutional	  order	  relies	  on	  a	  functionalist	  logic	  of	  legitimation	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  extent	  than	  domestic	  constitutional	  regimes.	  This	  reliance	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  distinctive	  set	  of	  challenges	  and	  contradictions.	  The	  European	  Union’s	  functionalist	  basis	  of	  legitimation	  is	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  number	  of	  objections.	  How	  far	  (if	  at	  all)	  can	  gains	  in	  policy	  effectiveness	  make	  up	  for	  losses	  in	  democratic	  control?	  If	  citizens	  cannot	  regard	  the	  decisions	  that	  govern	  them	  as	  having	  been	  authorized	  by	  them	  or	  by	  the	  elected	  representatives	  who	  serve	  at	  their	  pleasure,	  does	  it	  matter	  that	  these	  are,	  by	  some	  objective	  measure,	  the	  best	  decisions	  available	  in	  the	  circumstances?	  Is	  such	  an	  objective	  measure	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  available	  outside	  of	  what	  the	  people	  and	  their	  representatives	  decide	  for	  themselves?	  This	  is	  where	  the	  European	  Union	  parts	  ways	  with	  democratic	  systems	  of	  government.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  privileges	  a	  purportedly	  value-­‐neutral	  ideal	  of	  policy-­‐making	  as	  problem-­‐solving,	  the	  EU	  represents	  an	  epistocratic	  impulse	  that	  distrusts	  democratic	  majorities	  as	  short-­‐sighted,	  selfish,	  and	  likely	  to	  renege	  on	  their	  commitments.	  Defined	  by	  David	  Estlund	  as	  the	  “rule	  of	  the	  knowers,”117	  epistocracy	  asks	  citizens	  to	  “surrender”	  their	  own	  judgment	  on	  political	  questions	  to	  experts	  who	  are	  better	  placed	  than	  them	  to	  address	  political	  questions.118	  Although	  the	  decision-­‐making	  structures	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  typically	  depend	  on	  elected	  representatives	  in	  the	  Council	  and	  Parliament	  to	  negotiate	  desired	  outcomes	  in	  broad	  outline,	  it	  leaves	  their	  detailed	  implementation	  to	  technocrats	  within	  the	  Commission	  and	  within	  domestic	  administrative	  institutions.	  However,	  the	  extent	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  power	  wielded	  by	  the	  supranational	  technocracy	  throws	  into	  serious	  doubt	  the	  adequacy	  of	  functional	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  standalone	  source	  of	  legitimation,	  particularly	  when	  it	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  democratic	  self-­‐rule.	  As	  the	  EU’s	  roster	  of	  competences	  has	  grown,	  along	  with	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  issues	  entrusted	  to	  it,	  the	  functionalist	  claim	  has	  become	  increasingly	  inadequate	  in	  legitimating	  its	  authority.	  	  	  
                                                
116 Hendrickson, Peace Pact, 21 117	  David	  Estlund,	  “Beyond	  fairness	  and	  deliberation:	  the	  epistemic	  dimension	  of	  democratic	  authority,”	  in	  J.	  Bohman	  and	  W.	  Regh,	  Deliberative	  Democracy.	  Essays	  on	  Reason	  and	  Politics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  1997),	  at	  181-­‐183.	  118	  Ibid.	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Lastly,	  although	  democratic	  constitutionalism	  permits	  similar	  attenuations	  of	  decision-­‐making	  from	  democratic	  control,	  it	  nevertheless	  allows	  for	  a	  large	  measure	  of	  flexibility	  both	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ordinary	  legislation	  and	  constitutional	  change.	  By	  contrast,	  functional	  constitutionalism	  is	  far	  more	  rigid.	  The	  inflexibility	  and	  fixed	  teleology	  of	  supranational	  law	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  member	  states	  to	  change	  course	  in	  the	  face	  of	  sustained	  popular	  discontent,	  and	  renders	  design	  flaws	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  correct	  in	  the	  face	  of	  downstream	  systemic	  imperatives.	  Entrenched	  against	  revision,	  the	  European	  edifice	  risks	  becoming	  ineffective	  as	  well	  as	  undemocratic,	  undermining	  any	  plausible	  claim	  to	  outcome-­‐based	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  name	  of	  which	  democratic	  attenuation	  was	  justified	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  EU’s	  stark	  prioritization	  of	  effective	  over	  democratic	  government	  is	  self-­‐defeating:	  it	  threatens	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  supranational	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  their	  democratic	  legitimacy.	  	  	  
(iv) Conclusion	  	  	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  outlined	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  what	  I	  call	  the	  European	  Union’s	  system	  of	  functional	  constitutionalism.	  In	  particular,	  I	  highlighted	  three	  features	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  system,	  namely,	  the	  functionally	  specialized	  scope	  of	  authority,	  its	  teleological	  rigidity,	  and	  its	  functionalist	  pattern	  of	  legitimation,	  which	  premises	  the	  EU’s	  authority	  on	  its	  purported	  ability	  to	  make	  government	  more	  effective	  (rather	  than	  more	  democratic	  or	  more	  conducive	  to	  individual	  liberty).	  Each	  of	  these	  features	  differs	  to	  some	  degree	  from	  instantiations	  of	  the	  constitutional	  idea	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state,	  which	  is	  traditionally	  understood	  to	  entail	  a	  comprehensive,	  fully	  autonomous,	  and	  democratically	  authorized	  form	  of	  political	  ordering.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  fulfills	  a	  recognizably	  constitutional	  purpose:	  it	  responds	  to	  the	  formidable	  challenge	  of	  enforcing	  limits	  on	  public	  power,	  and	  employs	  recognizable	  constitutional	  mechanisms	  in	  doing	  so.	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  delve	  into	  substantive	  areas	  of	  EU	  law	  to	  deepen	  this	  contrast	  between	  functional	  constitutionalism	  and	  other	  models	  of	  constitutional	  rule.	  My	  aim	  will	  be	  critical:	  most	  of	  these	  alternative	  models	  are	  far	  more	  attractive	  normatively	  than	  functional	  constitutionalism,	  but	  alas,	  they	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  EU’s	  current	  configuration.	  Even	  as	  aspirational	  accounts,	  they	  underestimate	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  teleology	  of	  market-­‐building	  within	  the	  EU’s	  legal	  and	  institutional	  structure,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  teleology	  thwarts	  attempts	  at	  democratizing	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  broadening	  its	  normative	  horizons	  beyond	  the	  provision	  of	  material	  affluence.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  European	  Union	  can	  be	  considered	  either	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  organization	  or	  as	  the	  supranational	  instantiation	  of	  a	  conventional	  rights-­‐based	  model	  of	  constitutionalism.	  In	  response,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  EU’s	  regime	  of	  fundamental	  freedoms	  differs	  from	  each	  of	  these	  models	  on	  account	  of	  its	  narrow	  focus	  on	  economic	  mobility.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  European	  Union	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  system	  of	  democratic	  constitutionalism,	  and	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argue	  that	  despite	  the	  expansion	  of	  mechanisms	  of	  participatory	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  most	  important	  participatory	  mechanism	  within	  the	  Union	  remains	  that	  of	  market-­‐centered	  activity	  by	  private	  persons.	  In	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6,	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  a	  cosmopolitan	  federation	  devoted	  to	  promoting	  the	  “inclusion	  of	  the	  other.”119	  Here,	  too,	  the	  EU’s	  functional	  constitutionalism	  frustrates	  lofty	  expectations.	  The	  twin	  principles	  of	  free	  movement	  and	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  while	  seemingly	  universalistic	  on	  their	  face,	  are	  in	  fact	  quite	  limited	  in	  their	  material	  and	  personal	  scope,	  protecting	  member	  state	  citizens	  who	  engage	  in	  cross-­‐border	  commercial	  activity	  while	  offering	  little	  to	  third	  country	  nationals	  or	  non-­‐mobile	  EU	  citizens.	  The	  point	  of	  these	  substantive	  sketches	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  not	  simply	  critical,	  but	  also	  conceptual:	  I	  hope	  to	  throw	  the	  distinctive	  configuration	  of	  functional	  constitutionalism	  into	  high	  relief	  by	  contrasting	  it	  with	  more	  familiar	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  democratic,	  liberal,	  and	  cosmopolitan	  constitutionalism.	  While	  we	  may	  yet	  hope	  that	  the	  EU	  will	  come	  to	  approximate	  these	  aspirational	  paradigms,	  for	  the	  moment	  they	  remain	  that:	  aspirational.	  	  	  	  
                                                
119 Jurgen Habermas has coined this phrase to describe the project of uncoupling democratic participation 
from the nation-state. See	  especially,	  Jurgen	  Habermas,	  “The	  European	  Nation-­‐State:	  On	  the	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  Sovereignty	  and	  Citizenship”	  in	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other	  (MIT	  Press:	  1998), 
